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I. INTRODUCTION
This work seeks to examine the mechanism of limiting
damages under the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (CISG).1 The importance of the issue
of limiting damages can be realized when viewed in the light of
the role that damages play in a general framework of the CISG.
It has been said, "[n]o aspect of a system of contract law is more
revealing of its underlying assumptions than is the law that
prescribes the relief available for breach. '2 The right to dam-
ages plays a central role in the CISG remedial scheme. 3 Be-
cause the CISG regulates international sales contracts, which
serve as a basis for international economic relations, certainty
and predictability in the field of damages are exceptionally im-
portant principles of the Convention's legal regime. Thus, clar-
ity in the regulation of damages and the extent to which its
theoretical foundation has been elaborated are essential ele-
ments in determining the Convention's "underlying assump-
tions" and in effecting the trends of legal regulation of
international sales transactions.
The purpose of using a method of limiting damages is to
restrict the liability in damages. This makes the issue of limit-
ing damages an integral part of general legal regulation of dam-
ages. Therefore, it is difficult to achieve certainty and
predictability in the rules on damages unless the theoretical ba-
1 United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 reprinted in [1980] XI UNICTRAL YEARBOOK
149, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partIchapterX/treatyl7.asp [hereinafter CISGI.
2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 247,
247 (1979).
3 See HERBERT BERNSTEIN & JOSEPH M. LoOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE
CISG IN EUROPE: A COMPACT GUIDE TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 96 (1997).
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sis for regulation of the mechanism of limiting damages is de-
veloped. At the present moment, it seems that there is room for
further development. This article will examine the relevant
provisions of the CISG and emphasize some of the issues that
require further elaboration.4
Before discussing the methods of limiting damages, this ar-
ticle, for the sake of clarity and completeness, will examine such
issues as the interests protected and the categories of loss cov-
ered by the Convention. The reason for examining the interests
protected and the categories of loss here is because an examina-
tion of the methods of limiting damages is not complete without
taking these issues into consideration.
Further, the relevant provisions regarding and problems
related to them will be examined. Attention will be paid to the
treatment of analogous issues in some legal systems where sim-
ilar principles have been extensively developed, as well as in
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT Principles). 5 However, due to the international
character of the Convention, 6 the examination of the CISG will
not be based on the approaches of domestic legal systems. It is
believed that comparison is, probably, one of the most efficient
ways to underline some of the unique features inherent in some
legal regimes (especially in such a document as the CISG be-
cause of its self-standing position) and to develop solutions to
existing theoretical problems. As has been said in the context of
comparative law, the "different systems of the world can offer a
greater variety of solutions than could be thought up in a life-
time by even the most imaginative jurist who has corralled in
his own system."7
4 This article will not cover the issue of contractual limitation of damages.
5 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of In-
ternational Commercial Contracts (Rome 1994), available at http://www.undroit.
org/english/principles/chapter-l.htm [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
6 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
7 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
15 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987).
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II. INTERESTS PROTECTED AND CATEGORIES OF Loss
1. Expectation and Reliance Interests
The central principle relating to the measurement of dam-
ages, which is common to many legal systems, is the interest
that an aggrieved party has in the performance of the contract.
It is generally stated that a party has the right to be placed in
the same economic position he would have been in had the con-
tract been properly performed. 8 This interest is usually referred
to as "expectation interest." It is regarded as, "expectation mea-
sure is the natural measure of recovery, since it accords directly
with the underlying morality of promise keeping."9 A party's
expectation interest generally will represent the actual worth of
the contract to that party. 10 In principle, perfect expectation in-
terest will leave an injured party indifferent between perform-
ance and breach.1 ' In a global context, some believe that
realization of the expectation interest will "stimulate economic
activity, facilitate reliance on business agreements and protect
the "credit system."' 2
The expectation interest is not the only interest that may
be protected by an award of damages. Sometimes, the so-called
"reliance interest" is protected as well.' 3 The purpose of the re-
liance interest is to put the aggrieved party in as good a position
as he would have been had the contract never been performed.' 4
This usually is done by compensating a party for the losses in-
curred in reliance on the contract. 15 The idea behind this prin-
ciple is that if the contract has not been duly performed, the
aggrieved party may seek to recover those expenses incurred in
8 See G. H. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE
ACCOUNT 76 (1988) (emphasis added).
9 ANDREW S. BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND BREACH OF CONTRACT 20
(2d ed. 1994).
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS cmt. b 344 (Pamphlet No. 3
1981).
11 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 204 (2d ed.
1997).
12 A. I. Ocus, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 285 (1973).
13 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 76 (stating that the third protected interest is
the restitution interest. However, it will not be addressed in this article.).
14 See id. at 183.
15 See id.
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reliance on the contract, as these expenses would otherwise be
wasted.16
How are these interests reflected in the CISG? As stated,
"the basic philosophy of the action for damages is to put the in-
jured party in the same economic position he would have been
in if the contract had been performed." 17 Following this philoso-
phy, the damages provisions of the CISG are aimed at protect-
ing the injured party's expectation interest.18 This is made
clear by the wording of Article 74 - "loss, including loss of
profit."19 Consequently, it is logical that the reliance interest is
also covered by the CISG because recovery of the expectation
loss should, as a rule, include reliance loss. 20
With respect to the correlation between these two interests,
the point has been raised as to whether there is an obligation to
elect between the recovery of reliance and expectation dam-
ages. 21 This concern is not groundless. In some legal systems,
only strictly defined situations will give rise to a right to claim
16 See OGus, supra note 12, at 286.
17 Secretariat Commentary to Article 70 of the 1978 Draft, Commentary on
the Draft Convention Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Prepared by
the Secretariat, 3, UN Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (1997), available at http://www.cisg-
online.ch/cisg/materials-commentary.html#Article70 [hereinafter Secretariat
Commentary].
18 See BERNSTEIN & LoOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 99. See also HANS STOLL,
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
(CISG) 553 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas trans., 1998); Jeffrey S. Sut-
ton, Measuring Damages under the United Nations Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 50 OHIO ST. L. J. 737, 742 (1989), available at http:ll
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sutton.html; Eric C. Schneider, Measuring Dam-
ages under the CISG: Article 74 of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, 9 PACE INT'L L. REV. 223, 228 (1997), available at http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/cross/cross-74.html.
19 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
[Tihe promisee is to be measured by his expectation, that is, by "the bene-
fit of the bargain," and is not limited to the extent of his reliance losses ...
[I]t seems implicit in a reference to the promisee's "loss, including loss of
profit".... The word "loss" alone might be read narrowly to refer to out-of
pocket reliance expenditures, but the mention of "loss of profit" makes it
clear that this is not what is intended.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 249.
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, 344, illus. 2. See also Schnei-
der, supra note 18, at 228; BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 100; Sutton,
supra note 18, at 742; Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 247.
21 See JACOB ZIEGEL, INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVEN-
TION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 9-38, n.104 (Nina M.
Galston & Hans Smit eds., 1984).
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damages for both reliance and expectation losses. 22 However,
in relation to the CISG, there is no obligation to elect between
these interests. The idea, underlying Article 74, is to compen-
sate the injured party fully for the loss suffered as a conse-
quence of the breach. 23 In other words, all kinds of loss suffered
by the party should, in principle, be recoverable without the ne-
cessity of election. 24 Moreover, the text of the CISG does not
prescribe any concrete formula or contain any requirement
analogous to those found in the legal systems referred to above.
The types of loss that may be recovered will depend on the cir-
cumstances of a particular case. It is suggested that the CISG
did not intend to establish such an obligation, nor is it expedi-
ent to promote such a scheme.
On the other hand, it is to be borne in mind that overcom-
pensation should not be allowed. In other words, the recovery of
damages should not result in a profit to the innocent party.
25
What if the breach of the contract brings certain advantages to
the injured party? The UNIDROIT Principles, for example, ad-
dress this situation. According to Article 7.4.2, in determining
harm one should consider "any gain to the aggrieved party re-
sulting from its avoidance of cost or harm. 26 It seems that the
solution should be the same under the CISG. It has been said
that this rule was implicit in Article 74:
22 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 89-90.
23 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 553. See also VICTOR KNAPP, COMMENTARY ON
THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 543 (Cesare
Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonnell eds., 1987).
24 See section 11(2) of this article relating to categories of loss. See also the
discussion in section II(1) on interrelation between full compensation for harm and
expectation interest.
25 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 566.
26 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.2.
A hires out excavating machinery to B for two years at a monthly rental of
50,000 French francs. The contract is terminated after six months for non-
payment of the rentals. Six months later, A succeeds in renting out the
same machinery at a monthly charge of 55,000 French francs. The gain of
60,000 French francs realized by A as a result of the reletting of the ma-
chinery for the remainder of the initial contract, that is to say one year,
should be deducted from the damages due by B to A.
Id. at art.7.4.2 off. cmts.
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[T]he party entitled to damages does not suffer a "loss" to the ex-
tent that the breach of contract also confers advantages on him
which absorb the detriment suffered.2 7
A further issue, which needs to be addressed, is the rela-
tionship between the concepts of expectation interest and full
compensation for harm. These two concepts are widely used to-
gether in the discussion of the principles underlying Article 74.
For example, it has been said that Article 74 "expresses the
principle of full compensation"; that is, "the promisee has a
right to be fully compensated for all disadvantages he suffers as
a result of the promisor's breach of contract."28 It has been fur-
ther stated that "[tihose disadvantages are established by com-
paring the situation in which the promisee finds himself as a
result of the breach of contract with the situation in which he
would have found himself if the contract had been correctly per-
formed"(this is his expectation interest).29 The principle of full
compensation, therefore, is the basis for recovery of damages for
loss in many civil law systems. This formula comprises actual
loss (damnum emergens) and loss of profit (lucrum cessans).30 It
has been stated, "only owing to this principle will the full pro-
tection of the interests of those, who suffer losses . . . be
provided."31
Since both expectation interest and the full compensation
of harm are used in relation to the same subject matter, it is
necessary to clarify their use. Three different views can be
taken with respect to the relationship of these two concepts.
First, prima facie, it seems that these concepts mean the same
thing, i.e., they are both used to describe the principle underly-
ing Article 74. Second, the concept of "full compensation for
harm," which is reflected in the CISG in the same way as it is
27 STOLL, supra note 18, at 566.
28 Id. at 553. See also Landgericht [District Court] 45 0237/79, 10 June 1980
(F.R.G.), http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases/800610gl.html (where the
court stated that the principle of full compensation was applicable to Article 82 of
the ULIS).
29 STOLL, supra note 18, at 553. See also KNAPP, supra note 23, at 543;
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.2 (this article directly employs the
term "full compensation for harm"). Id. at art. 7.4.2 (1).
30 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 84. See also M.I. BRAGINSKIY & V.V. VITRYAN-
sKIY, DOGOVORNOYE PRAVO [CONTRACT LAw] 516 (1998); 0. S. JOFFE, OBYAZATOL
sTvENNYE PRAvo [LAw OF OBLIGATIONS] 103 (1975) (trans. by D. Saidov).
31 JOFFE, supra note 30, at 103.
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established in some civil law systems, covers all possible kinds
of loss. As to the expectation loss, one can argue that it does not
cover all types of loss. This article will show that the CISG, in
addition to other types of loss, also covers the losses, which in
some common law systems are referred to as "consequential"
and "incidental" losses. It has been stated that these two kinds
of loss do not form a part of a party's expectation. 32 Third, it
can be said that, in essence, these concepts convey the same
idea but "play different roles": expectation interest represents
the ultimate goal of the damages claim, and full compensation
for harm is the means or mechanism of achieving that goal or
satisfying that interest. It seems that the last view is the most
acceptable one.
2. Categories of Loss
Article 74 provides for compensation for "loss, including
loss of profit, suffered as a consequence of the breach."33 Fol-
lowing the logic of this provision, it can be concluded that loss
should be divided into two main categories: "actual"34 and "ef-
fective"35 loss and loss of profit. 36 Besides this broad division,
Article 74 does not define what concrete types of loss can be
compensated. It seems that the principle of full compensation
for harm, in the light of the particular contract and circum-
stances, should be the basis for determining the loss. 3 7 This
principle, in turn, leads us to conclude that all kinds of loss,
suffered by the party and caused by the breach, are
recoverable. 38
However, some commentators have gone further. They
have worked out the classification in order to identify concrete
forms or types of loss besides the main categories of loss men-
tioned above. In particular, it has been suggested that in the
32 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 86-88.
33 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
34 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 559.
35 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 543.
36 Redressing both these elements of loss constitutes the principle of full com-
pensation for harm. See id. See also UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art.
7.4.2 off. cmts.
37 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 558.
38 This recovery is subject to the rules of limiting damages. See BERNSTEIN &
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 99.
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context of actual loss "[1losses caused by breach of contract may
take the form of loss by the non-performance as such, incidental
loss, or other losses consequent upon the breach [consequential
loss]."39 This commentator has defined each of these "forms of
loss" 40 and examined the way these losses should be treated
under the CISG.41
There have been attempts to identify the losses recoverable
under the CISG, and to clarify the situation in that respect is
appreciated. However, in this article, this classification will not
be relied upon. It is suggested that there is no objective need to
try to "embrace," through such a classification, a wide diversity
of different "forms" of loss that can arise in practice. Article 74
has been formulated in such a way as to cover any situation,
which causes any type or "form of loss," provided that its re-
quirements are met. Therefore, it seems that, in terms of prac-
tical application of this provision, there is no need to "view" a
situation through the suggested classification because the
formula in Article 74 will suffice. Nor does the classification
seem to be necessary for the development of the "theory" of the
CISG. For the sake of illustration, let us refer to a legal system,
where the issue of types of loss is treated in an analogous way.
Article 14 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan
provides that damages consist of "expenses, which a person,
whose right has been infringed, has incurred or will have to in-
cur in order to redress the infringed right, loss or damage to its
property (real loss) [as well as] profits, which have not been re-
ceived and which would have been received.., if his right had
39 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 559.
40 See id.
Loss by the non-performance as such is the deficit in performance irre-
spective of further consequences of the breach. Here, one can speak of a
promisee's primary or direct loss. "Incidental losses" are expenses in-
curred by the aggrieved party, not to realize his expectation interest, but
to avoid any additional disadvantages (here, the commentator refers di-
rectly to the UCC). "Consequential loss" caused by a breach includes addi-
tional losses going beyond non-performance loss as such, for example, the
promisee's liability to third persons consequent upon his failure to per-
form following the promisor's breach, or harm caused to person or prop-
erty by a defect in the goods.
Id.
41 See id. at 559-63.
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not been infringed."42 Even though this provision has been
elaborated in a bit greater detail, it is analogous to the ap-
proach taken by Article 74 of the CISG. As in the case with the
CISG, this provision is based on the principle of full compensa-
tion for harm and serves the purpose of restoring the position
that the party would have been in had the obligation properly
been performed.43 With respect to Article 14, it could be equally
stated that, in a legal sense, real loss should be constituted by a
number of different "forms" of loss. However, the concept of real
loss, which has been used since its establishment in Roman
law,44 has not been treated as being constituted, in a legal
sense, of "forms" of loss. So far, this treatment of real loss, in
the theory of civil law, has been rather acceptable. Since the
formula used in the CISG is similar to that provided in the Civil
Code of Uzbekistan and some other civil law systems, the expe-
rience of the treatment of this issue in civil law should not be
disregarded. The classification serves as a useful example re-
flecting certain types or "forms" of loss that occur in practice.
However, in the framework of the CISG, the suggested "forms"
of loss should not be treated as legal categories.
Further, it is to be noted that terminology used to identify
the "forms" of loss can lead to some confusion since that termi-
nology is widely used in some legal systems.45 Moreover, some
of the terms used have several different meanings. 46 Taking
into account the "international character" of the Convention,47
this type of terminology should be avoided as much as possible.
Thus, this article will adhere to the model, which follows di-
rectly from Article 74, i.e., actual loss and loss of profit.
42 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 14 (Uzb.) (trans. by D. Saidov) (emphasis added).
See also GK RF art. 15, reprinted in The Civil Code of the Russian Federation, pts.
1, 2, 7-8 (Peter B. Maggs ed. and trans., 1997).
43 See BRAGINSKIY & VITRYANSKIY, supra note 30, at 518.
44 See id. at 524.
45 Terms such as "incidental" and "consequential" losses are used in some
common law systems.
46 For the different meanings in which the term "consequential loss" has been
used, see TREITEL, supra note 8, at 87.
47 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
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(a) Actual Loss
Actual loss can be defined as any reduction in the assets of
an injured party as they existed when the contract was con-
cluded, 48 or an increase in his liabilities that, for example, "oc-
curs when an obligee, not having been paid by its obligor, must
borrow money to meet its commitments."4 9 As mentioned
above, there can be a great variety of forms in which actual loss
can manifest. Therefore, it does not seem possible to list all
forms that actual loss may take.50 Nonetheless, so long as the
necessary requirements have been met,51 the compensation for
actual loss should be awarded under Article 74.
(b) Loss of Profit
The second category of loss to which Article 74 specifically
refers is the loss of profit. 52 Loss of profit is in a different cate-
gory because it is substantially different from that of actual
loss. In particular, whereas actual loss generally means the
diminution in the assets of an injured party at the time of the
conclusion of the contract, loss of profit means the loss of any
increase in the assets caused by the breach. 53 In other words,
loss of profit means that, if the contract had been performed
properly and the breach had not been committed, the injured
party would have enjoyed an increase in his assets. It has been
said that both categories of loss (actual loss and profit loss) are
regulated in the same way in the CISG. 54 However, one essen-
tial difference between the two, reflected in the Convention's
scheme, should be addressed. This difference relates to the ef-
fect of Article 44.55 Namely, this Article allows for the disre-
48 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 561.
49 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.2 2 off. cmts. The usage of
the comments to the UNIDROIT Principles in this context seems acceptable since
it is stated that, in this respect, Article 7.4.2 of the Principles follows Article 74 of
the CISG. Id.
50 The classification discussed in section 11(2) of this article is helpful in the
illustration of a diversity of the forms of loss.
51 See section III of this article on methods of limiting damages.
52 A direct reference to this type of loss is explained by the fact that, in some
legal systems, the "loss" by itself does not include the loss of profit. See Secretariat
Commentary, supra note 17, 3. See also KNAPP, supra note 23, at 543.
53 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 563.
54 See id.
55 See id.
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gard of the provisions of Articles 39 and 4356 if the buyer has a
reasonable excuse for the failure to give the required notice. If
the buyer does not have a reasonable excuse, he may reduce the
price or claim damages. However, in that type of claim for dam-
ages, the loss of profit cannot be demanded. 57
(c) "Lost Volume" Situation
This section of the article will examine the problem identi-
fied as the "lost volume" situation.58 This doctrine has received
extensive development in American judicial practice and aca-
demic writings. The type of loss, implied by the term "lost vol-
ume," is likely to arise in international sales transactions.
Therefore, an understanding of the essence of this concept and
its place (if any) within the Convention's legal regime is ex-
tremely important.
The concept of "lost volume" has been the subject of an
enormous debate. Nevertheless, it can be defined. Lost volume
is a type of loss that can be sustained only by a party who acts
as a seller. In a lost volume situation, a seller has fewer cus-
tomers than he can supply.5 9 After one of his buyers commits a
breach of contract by repudiating the contract, not accepting or
rejecting the goods, the seller successfully resells the contract
goods to a different buyer. However, the second sale cannot be
a replacement for the original contract. The reason is that the
second buyer would have purchased these goods from the seller,
even if the original contract had been performed. Therefore, the
seller has "lost volume." His "total number of sales [has been]
reduced by the quantity represented by the original contract."60
56 According to Article 39, the buyer loses the right to rely on the lack of con-
formity in the goods, and, accordingly, to claim damages, if he does not give notice
within a reasonable time from the moment he discovered or ought to have discov-
ered the non-conformity. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 39. Article 43 provides that
if the buyer does not give the seller the notice of nature of claims of a third party,
provided in this Article, he will lose the right to rely on Articles 41 and 42, and,
consequently, to exercise the relevant remedies. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 43.
57 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 44.
58 The term was first coined by Professor Robert J. Harris, cited in Daniel W.
Matthews, Should the Doctrine of Lost Volume Seller Be Retained? A Response to
Professor Breen, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1199 (1997).
59 See Roy Ryden Anderson, Damages for Sellers under the Code's Profit
Formula, 40 Sw. L. J. 1021, 1023 (1986).
60 John M. Breen, The Lost Volume Seller and Lost Profits Under U.C.C. § 2-
708(2): A Conceptual and Linguistic Critique, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 793 (1996).
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The second transaction cannot make the seller whole. This
transaction would have been made in any event. Yet, the
breach has prevented the seller from earning one more profit
from the original contract. 61
Let us illustrate this type of situation by an example. Sup-
pose that S has several identical tables he wants to sell. B1 con-
tracts to buy one table. Shortly after the conclusion of the
contract, B1 repudiates. S resells the table to B2. S claims that
this resale did not put him into the position he would have been
in had the contract with B1 been performed. If B1 had not
breached, S also would have sold a table to B2, and earned two
units of profit, instead of one.
The lost volume concept has been strongly criticized on con-
ceptual and economic grounds. Although this article will not
engage in a detailed discussion of the problem with lost volume,
it is necessary to point out the main grounds for the criticism of
the doctrine.
First, it has been said that the lost volume concept is not in
line with the seller's duty to mitigate.6 2 This issue will be ad-
dressed later in this work.63
Second, it has been argued that the seller's expectation in-
terest in the profit from the second sale is unprotected. 64 Ac-
cording to this view, the seller's expectation should be evaluated
only at the time of entering into a valid contract.
A valid contract is the basis for legal protection of a party's expec-
tation. Accordingly, at the time of the conclusion of the contract
with the breaching buyer, the seller's expectation is legally pro-
tected only under this contract. Although the law protects the
seller's expected benefit under a valid contract for the sale of
goods, it does not protect the seller's expectation as to what his
market will be like following the contract. 65 . . . The seller's ex-
61 See also a definition in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, 347, cmt.(f).
62 This argument has been put forward by Professor Morris Shanker. See
Morris G. Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of UCC Section 2-708(2) (One
Profit for the Reseller), 24 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 697, 701-03 (1973). See also
Breen, supra note 60, at 819-20; Matthews, supra note 58, at 1213-14; Sherwin J.
Malkin, Beware the Lost Volume Seller, May 6 CBA Record 2025 (1992).
63 See section III(4)(d) for a discussion of the "lost volume" situation.
64 See Breen supra note 60, at 823-27.
65 Id. at 827.
2002]
13
PACE INT'L L. REV.
pectation that he will resell the goods does not arise until after
the original buyer has repudiated the deal. The seller does not
have this expectation until after he has entered into the contract
with the second buyer. In awarding the profit remedy to volume
sellers, courts retroactively apply this expectation to the forma-
tion of the original contract, the only time at which expectations
are relevant with respect to the contract goods. In other words,
the seller's expectation of an additional sale is actually a post hoc
expectation, which is an oxymoron. 6
6
It is argued that this point does not withstand close
analysis:
The lost volume seller's expectation in the second sale is unpro-
tected until the seller enters into the second contract. At that
time, the seller has a protectable interest in the original contract,
and a separate and distinct protectable expectation in the second
sale .... [Tihe lost volume seller is not claiming a protectable
interest in two transactions at the time of the original sale. Con-
versely, the lost volume seller claims an expectation in two con-
tracts entered into at different intervals. Thus, the argument over
the lost volume seller is not whether the seller has a protectable
expectation in the post-contractual market, but whether, after the
second sale is consummated, the expectation on the second sale
should be used to reduce the expectation interest on the original
sale.
6 7
The third critical argument is that the award of damages,
flowing from the lost volume, overcompensates the seller. It
puts the seller into a better position than the one he would have
been in had the original contract been performed. 68 This view
naturally flows from the second argument, that is, that the
seller does not have a protectable expectation in being in such a
position.69 Since the second argument has not been supported,
the "overcompensation" point cannot be accepted as well.
Although the CISG does not explicitly address this issue, it
is suggested that, in the framework of the CISG, loss of volume
should be recognized as a valid legal concept. As has been
shown above, the Convention's damages remedy is based on the
66 Id. at 824.
67 Matthews, supra note 58, at 1216.
68 See Breen, supra note 60, at 827-30.
69 See id. at 827.
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concept of expectation interest. In lost volume situations, un-
less an injured party is compensated properly for this type of
loss, he will not be put into the position he would have been in if
the contract had been the contract performed. However, proce-
dures for measuring damages under the CISG, as stipulated in
Articles 75 (so-called "concrete" calculation)70 and 76 ("abstract"
calculation),71 will not restore a party's expectation interest.
For instance, in the example above, if after avoidance of the con-
tract S "within a reasonable time" and for the same price resells
the table to B2, there will be no difference between the contract
price and the price in the second transaction. The seller cannot
recover damages under Article 75, even though he suffered the
loss of an additional profit he would have received had there
been no breach. If, however, S resells the table at a price lower
than the contract price, then he only will be able to recover the
difference between the contract price and the price in the sec-
ond transaction. Again, this difference will not compensate him
for the additional profit that he would have received had he sold
one more table. Analogous results will follow if abstract calcu-
lation under Article 76 is applied. However, both Articles 75
and 76 provide that an injured party may recover "any further
damages recoverable under Article 74."72 It seems that this al-
lowance can adequately cover a lost volume claim.73
70 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 75.
If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a
reasonable time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replace-
ment or the seller has resold the goods, the party claiming damages may
recover the difference between the contract price and the price in the sub-
stitute transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under
[A]rticle 74.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 75.
71 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 76
If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the
party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale
under [Alrticle 75, recover the difference between the price fixed by the
contract and the current price at the time of avoidance as well as any
further damages recoverable under [Alrticle 74. If, however, the party
claiming damages has avoided the contract after taking over the goods,
the current price at the time of such taking over shall be applied instead
of the current price at the time of avoidance.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 76.
72 CISG, supra note 1, arts. 75, 76.
73 See ZIEGEL, supra note 21, § 9-41. Articles 75 and 76 "adequately cover a
lost volume claim." Id. See also JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM SALEs LAW FOR IN-
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At least in one case, decided in Germany, 74 the court
awarded damages for loss of volume. In that case, the seller
agreed to manufacture and sell jewelry to the buyer.75 The
buyer did not pay and delivery was not made. The court stated
that damage, suffered by the seller, would arise "regardless of a
possible resale of the goods ordered to a subsequent buyer, as
the later contract would have beer formed independently of the
[buyer's] order."76
In another case, decided in the United States, the seller de-
livered defective compressors, which the buyer intended to use
in its manufacture of air conditioners. 77 In that case, the buyer
was unable to obtain substitute compressors from other sources,
and therefore suffered loss in the volume of air conditioners that
it was able to manufacture for the selling season.78 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York
found that the CISG permitted "recovery of lost profit resulting
from a diminished volume of sales."79 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld this decision.80 How-
ever, though the loss in this case was called "loss in volume," it
does not represent the type of loss being discussed in this part
of the article. First, the injured party acted as a buyer under
the original contract with the breaching party. As has been
mentioned above, loss of volume (in the sense it is meant here)
can pertain only to a seller. Second, in a "classic" lost volume
situation, the seller has sufficient supply and insufficient de-
mand. In the present case, the breach diminished the party's
capacity to supply, which led to loss of a certain number of cus-
tomers. Thus, the party did not have sufficient capacity to sup-
TERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 512-13 (2d ed.
1991).
74 See Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] 2 Ob 100/00w, 28 Apr. 2000
(Aus.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000428a3.html.
75 See id.
76 Id.
77 See Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corporation, No. 88-CV-1078, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12820, *3 (N.D.N.Y. 1994), affd and rev'd in part, 71 F.3d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1995), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/940909u1.html.
78 See Delchi Carrier, SpA, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12820, at *9.
79 Id at *14.
80 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the district court's
findings were "not clearly erroneous." See Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corpora-
tion, 71 F.3d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1995), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisglwais/db/
cases2/951206ul.html.
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ply its potential customers. As will be seen later in this article,
the seller cannot be a lost volume seller unless he can prove
that he had actual capacity to supply his customers. Moreover,
in this case, an injured party seems to have had sufficient de-
mand for its goods. It lost its potential customers as a result of
an insufficient capacity. Thus, although the court used the
term "loss in the volume," this case does not reflect the situation
under consideration.
Although it is argued that loss of volume should be covered
by the CISG, an elaboration of strict standards in relation to a
lost volume seller is crucial. If there are no such standards, a
seller may find himself overcompensated. Fortunately, Ameri-
can legal academics have developed general criteria that a
seller must meet in order to qualify as a lost volume seller. Pro-
fessor Harris has developed three main requirements that a lost
volume seller must meet: "(1) the person who bought the resold
entity would have been solicited by the plaintiff had there been
no breach or resale; (2) the solicitation would have been success-
ful; and (3) the plaintiff could have performed that additional
contract." l8 Most American courts and commentators have
adopted these requirements.8 2 However, another formulation
of this test will be relied upon in this article.
In order to identify a lost volume seller two questions must
be answered in affirmative: (1) Could the seller have supplied
both the original and the resale buyer? (2) Would the seller
have sold the goods to the resale buyer even if there had been no
repudiation by the original buyer?8 3
The first question focuses on a seller's capacity to supply
both buyers. This element is crucial for establishing a lost vol-
81 Jerald B. Holisky, Finding the 'Lost Volume Seller: Two Independent Sales
Deserve Two Profits under Illinois Law, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 363, 375 (1998).
In addition to the requirements defined by Holisky, some courts have adopted a
fourth requirement. The fourth requirement is that the seller must show that it
would have been profitable for him to make both sales. See generally R.E. Davis
Chemical Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987), cited in Malkin,
supra note 62. However, this requirement seems to be arguable and will not be
relied upon in this article. Compare Breen, supra note 60, at 795-96.
82 See Breen, supra note 60, at 794.
83 See Holisky, supra note 81, at 380-82. The reason Holisky used such a for-
mulation of the test is that in his opinion, the first two requirements in Harris' test
address the concern, reflected by the second question, "but not in sufficient detail
to be useful." Id. at 382, n. 113-14.
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ume case. Imagine that a small seller produces the goods to the
limit of his capacity. If buyer 1 breaches the contract, this seller
resells the goods to buyer 2. Had buyer 1 not breached, the
seller would not have been able to sell the goods to buyer 2 due
to his limited capacity. The seller has not, in fact, suffered any
loss of volume. The sale to buyer 2 should be considered merely
as a mitigation measure.8 4
Deciding the issue of whether a seller in question was a lost
volume seller, the courts will need to rely not on a theoretical
ability to supply, but on a practical ability to supply both buy-
ers, based upon the circumstances of a particular case.8 5 It is
necessary for a seller to prove that he had, for example, exces-
sive capacity to manufacture the goods or ready access to addi-
tional inventory. 6 If he cannot do that, then if he wants to
qualify as a lost volume seller, he will need to present evidence
that "he would, in fact, have expanded his manufacturing oper-
ations, or sought and found replacement stock outside his regu-
lar supply channels. 87
The second question is whether the seller would have made
a second transaction even if there had been no breach by the
first buyer. Put in a different way, the question is whether the
first sale and resale after the breach are "wholly independent
events."8 If an answer to this question is "no," a seller cannot
be regarded as having suffered loss of volume. Several guide-
lines have been put forward to help us determine whether the
second sale would have been made, had there been no breach.
84 See John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies under Article Two of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: An Agenda for Review, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 360, 386-87 (1981).
85 See Holisky, supra note 81, at 380. Holisky also refers to an American case
Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 463 N.E. 2d 70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). In this
case, a retail boat dealer was denied a lost profit because the only proof of the
seller's capacity that was offered was testimony by the dealer's salesman that "to
his knowledge" the plaintiff-dealer had an unlimited supply of the same type of
boat and equipment that the defendant had purchased. Id. at 73.
86 See Holisky, supra note 81, at 380-81.
87 Id. at 381.
88 Id. at 382. See also Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., Inc., 380 A.2d
618 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (where the court stated that "[t]he whole concept of
lost volume is the sale of the goods to the resale purchaser could have been made
with other goods had there been no breach. In essence, the original sale and the
second sale are independent events, becoming related only after the breach, as the
original sale goods are applied to the second sale.") Id. at 625.
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First, the fact that the seller has made some special efforts
to carry out the second sale is said to serve as an indication
that, absent the breach, this sale would not have been made.
"Such special efforts might include advertising.., or highlight-
ing the breached item on the showroom floor. Any of these ac-
tions indicate that the seller would not have solicited the
ultimate resale purchaser except for the breach, therefore, any
lost volume is illusory."8 9
Second, the needs of a particular resale buyer are to be
taken into consideration.9 0 Third, the characteristics of the
goods under the original contract must be considered. The gen-
eral idea is that the more specific the goods are, the more likely
the resale is not a lost volume sale. The resale can be the result
of either the seller's special efforts or of the particular needs of
the second buyer.9 1
Both requirements, the "capacity" and "wholly independent
events" tests, must be met. Meeting only one of these require-
ments is not sufficient to establish a lost volume case. This es-
sential rule in analyzing a potential lost volume situation has
been repeatedly ignored by American courts. Instead of having
applied both requirements (or three requirements in Harris'
test), they deemed it sufficient to establish only a "capacity" ele-
ment.9 2 Such a treatment of a potential lost volume case should
not be allowed. It is most likely to result in overcompensation.
89 Holisky, supra note 81, at 384.
90 See Sebert, supra note 84, at 388.
[Ihf the resale buyer was in the market only for an orange convertible
which he could buy "off the lot", and the seller only had such a car, be-
cause the original buyer breached his special order contract, there is no
lost volume even though the dealer passed the capacity test and even
though he took no special actions to resell the vehicle. On the other hand,
if the resale buyer was in the market for a Chevrolet of the same general
type and style of the car that the original buyer refused, then it seems
likely that the dealer would have sold same type of car to the resale pur-
chaser anyway.
Holisky, supra note 81, at 384-85.
91 See id. at 385.
92 See Nederlandse Draadindustrie NDI B.V. v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp.,
466 F. Supp. 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979). See also
Distribu-Dor, Inc. v. Karadanis, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d App. Dist.
1970); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (1972), cited in Sebert, supra
note 84, at n. 116. See generally Great Western Sugar Co. v. Mrs. Alison's Cookie
Co., 563 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Mo. 1983), affd on other grounds, 749 F.2d 516 (8th
Cir. 1984); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus., Inc., 696 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. Ct. App.
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The seller should qualify as a lost volume seller only when both
requirements are met.
The guidelines above are based principally on writings of
American legal scholars and practice of American courts. But,
it is suggested that they can be applied to the CISG. As shown
above, application of Articles 75 and 76 alone will not lead to
fair results. Article 74 should be the basis for recovery of lost
volume to obtain fair results. However, Article 74 does not ex-
plicitly provide for such a situation. Therefore, proper guide-
lines are necessary so that the courts and arbitrators can
address such cases. The rules suggested by this article seem to
lead to sensible and fair results. The fact, in itself, that these
rules are based on the American legal practice and were devel-
oped by American lawyers should not impair the "international
character" of the Convention. On the contrary, experience of
American courts reflects different legal aspects and problems of
modern commercial activity. For an "international lawyer" this
experience should help address analogous problems in the "in-
ternational context." An international lawyer should be careful
in using this experience. The regulation of international trans-
actions governed by the CISG should not be based on the legal
concepts and principles of one particular legal system. Al-
though lost volume is a concept used within the American legal
system, it represents a problem that is not "alien" to interna-
tional transactions. We should not "view" such situations
through the prism of American legal principles and rely upon
purely domestic sources of law. Rather, we should search for
sensible solutions, offered by that legal system without impair-
ing the international character of the Convention and contribut-
ing to achieving uniformity in its application. In a lost volume
case, the American legal system seems to offer helpful
guidelines.
(d) The Problem of Non-Material Loss
How should a situation where non-material loss was caused
by the breach be addressed in a situation where the CISG is
applicable? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to
define the term "non-material loss," determine the forms it can
1984); Kaiserman v. Martin J. Ain, Ltd., 112 Misc.2d 768, 450 N.Y.S.2d 135 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981) cited in Holisky, supra note 81, at n. 86, n. 89.
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have and correlate this concept with the nature of legal rela-
tionships governed by the CISG.
Non-material loss is defined as loss flowing from an injury
or damage to non-material values. Non-material values are val-
ues that do not have "economic content" and are inseparable
from the personality of the bearer of these values. 93 Non-mate-
rial values include: life; health; dignity; honor; reputation; etc.
Accordingly, non-material loss is loss or harm flowing from in-
jury to health, physical or moral suffering, damage to honor and
reputation, etc.94
In general, the CISG does not cover non-material loss.
First, the Convention is mostly applicable to relationships of
commercial character. Generally, commercial relations are
aimed at achieving material or pecuniary purposes. These pur-
poses do not involve non-material categories. Accordingly, one
can conclude that in a commercial setting, non-material loss is
not likely to arise and should not be claimed. 95
Additionally, most commercial players are legal entities
(corporate bodies), and the question arises as to whether legal
entities can sustain non-material loss. It seems that, generally,
a legal entity should not be capable of suffering this type of loss.
For example, the National and International Arbitral Tribunal
of Milan, applying the UNIDROIT Principles, excluded compen-
sation for emotional harm and distress because the injured
party was a corporate entity. 96
Finally, it should be noted that in one case, decided by the
Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Rus-
sian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the plain-
93 See GRAZHDANSKOYE PRAVO [CIVIL LAw] PART 1 312 (A.P. Sergeyev & Y.K.
Tolstoy eds., 1998) (trans. D. Saidov).
94 In this regard, see UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.2 5 off.
cmts.
95 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 558, where it has been stated, "[cross-border
transactions normally serve commercial ends. Consequently, in principle, compen-
sation for non-material loss cannot be claimed." Id.
96 See Camera Arbitrale Nazionale ed Internazionale di Milano [National and
International Arbitral Tribunal] A-1795/51, 01 Dec. 1996 (Italy), http:l!
www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfn?dsmid=136208&x=1. However, this matter is not
that straightforward. For instance, Plenum of the Supreme Court of Russian Fed-
eration in its resolution N 10, dated 20 December 1994 was inclined to suggest that
moral harm can be inflicted upon a legal person, and the compensation for it
should be allowed. See GRAZHDANSKOYE Pa.vo, supra note 93, at 325.
2002]
21
PACE INT'L L. REV.
tiff was denied compensation for "moral harm."97 The Tribunal,
in denying compensation, found that the CISG did not contain
provisions regarding the compensation for "moral harm" in a
situation analogous to the case under consideration.
98
Nonetheless, it seems that there may be at least two situa-
tions in which non-material loss may be compensated. The first
situation is when the purpose of the transaction is entirely non-
material, and the parties are aware of such a purpose. 99 In this
situation, the loss caused by the breach, which totally or sub-
stantially undermines the whole (non-material) purpose of the
transaction, should be recoverable. However, in the context of
international commerce, a situation of this kind seems to be
atypical.
The second situation is where an injured party's business
reputation is adversely affected as a result of the breach. In
commerce, in general, and in international sales, in particular,
business reputation plays an important role. It can affect and
sometimes pre-determine the state of affairs of a subject of com-
mercial activity.100 Thus, this section of the article will ex-
amine why and how loss of, or injury to, reputation should be
governed by the CISG.
The issue of injury to reputation needs to be approached
carefully. In order to understand the legal implications of this
form of loss, it is helpful to consider the treatment of this matter
in English law.
English cases have established a distinction between an in-
jury to reputation as being non-material (non-pecuniary) loss
and pecuniary loss, flowing from such an injury. While loss of
97 For regulation of "moral harm" in some legal systems, see the CODE CML
[C. civ.] arts. 1021, 1022 (Ubz). See also GK RF, supra note 43, art. 151. For a
discussion of this issue, see GRAZHDANSKOYE PRAvo, supra note 93, at 323-25.
98 See MIKHAIL GRIGORIEVICH ROZENBERG, KoNTRAKT MEZHDUNARODNOY
KUPLI-PRODAZHI [CONTRACT OF INTERNATIONAL SALEs] 73 (1998) (trans. D. Saidov).
99 "For example, if both parties understood the purpose of a contract for the
sale of a motor vehicle to be to enable the buyer to undertake a holiday trip."
STOLL, supra note 18, at 558.
100 For instance, "impairment of business reputation can bring about loss of
customers, making heavier the conditions of obtaining the credit. On the other
hand, business reputation, which has been formed, can serve as a guarantee that a
businessman will remain "afloat", even when his business went down." GRAZHDAN-
SKOYE PRAVO, supra note 93, at 315.
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reputation in itself cannot be recovered, 10' pecuniary loss
caused by loss of reputation has been held recoverable in sev-
eral cases. 10 2 Should loss of (injury to) reputation in itself be
separated from pecuniary loss flowing from it? It is submitted
that business reputation should be regarded as a separate legal
category. Business reputation can be defined as an opinion of
"business actors" on another subject of commercial activity,
which has been formed on the basis of its professional quali-
ties. 10 3 Although, as we can see from this definition, the nature
of the business reputation is wholly non-material, it represents
certain value in and of itself. One of course can argue that since
the ultimate purpose of good reputation in business is to make a
profit, the loss of (injury to) reputation should have legal signifi-
cance only when it leads to a loss of profit. 0 4 However, it seems
incorrect to consider the "legal status" of reputation exclusively
in the context of the principal purpose of commercial activity as
making a profit. Regardless of whether or not damage to repu-
tation has led to loss of profit, reputation in itself should re-
present a separate non-material category, which has its own
value. Consequently, damage inflicted upon reputation should
entail the non-material loss of the value of the reputation itself.
Thus, it is suggested that, at least in theory, loss of reputa-
tion in itself should be recoverable under Article 74. It is the
form of loss, and the principle of full compensation for harm
that should be the basis for recoverability. Perhaps, here, it is
101 See Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd., A.C. 488, 489 (H.L. 1909). See generally
O'Laoire v Jackel International Ltd., 2 I.C.R. 718 (C.A. 1991).
102 See Aerial Advertising Co. v. Batchelor's Peas Ltd., 2 All E.R. 788 (K.B.
1938). See also Groom v. Crocker, 60 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 393, 419 (C.A. 1938);
Anglo-Continental Holidays Ltd. v. Typaldos Lines (London) Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep.
61, 64, 66 (C.A. 1967); GKN Centrax Gears Ltd. v. Matbro Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 555
(C.A. 1976).
103 See GRAZHDANSKOYE PRAvo, supra note 93, at 317.
104 The [buyer] cannot claim a loss of turnover, on the one hand - which
could be reimbursed in the form of lost profits - and then, on the other
hand, try to get additional compensation for a loss in reputation. A dam-
aged reputation is completely insignificant as long as it does not lead to a
loss of turnover and consequently lost profits. A businessperson runs his
business from a commercial point of view. As long as he has the necessary
turnover, he can be completely indifferent towards his image
Landgerischt [District Court] 10 0 72/00, 9 May 2000 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.
pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000509gl.html.
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relevant to cite the critical words of one commentator in rela-
tion to the position taken by English courts.
What about the continued denial of damages for loss of reputation
in itself that is a non-pecuniary loss? While perhaps less crucial,
there is again no justification for this restriction. Adherence to
full compensation dictates recovery, and although proof of this
loss may be difficult, as may assessing damages, these are not
reasons for blanket refusal .... 105
In practice, a party seldom will be able to recover the dam-
ages for loss of (injury to) reputation because of the difficulty of
proving such a loss and of meeting the requirements of Article
74.106 Even if a party proves that he has suffered a loss of repu-
tation, it will be very difficult to calculate his loss. At best, "all
the courts can aim for is a fair and reasonable sum." 10 7
As mentioned above, loss or injury to reputation can lead to
pecuniary loss in the form of loss of profit. This can be called
material manifestation of non-material loss. Loss of profit, in a
commercial context, is, probably, the main negative result
caused by loss of reputation. Loss of profit is more likely to be
claimed in cases where reputation has been damaged.108 As in
the case with the loss of reputation in itself, the requirements of
Article 74 are of particular importance in establishing the liabil-
ity of a party in question.
It seems that, in practice, proving this type of loss will not
be easy.10 9 However, once the requirements of Article 74 have
been met, this loss should be compensated. For example, the
Helsinki Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Court of
First Instance, which had allowed damages that resulted from
105 BURROWS, supra note 9, at 224.
106 See section III of this article for a discussion on the methods of limiting
damages. For example, with respect to the rule of foreseeability, it has been said
that "[a stricter] test is to be applied as regards foreseeability of a buyer's loss of
goodwill .... The seller is as a rule liable for such loss of goodwill only if, at the
time of the conclusion of the contract, the buyer pointed out the risk of the particu-
lar type of loss." STOLL, supra note 18, at 571.
107 BURROWS, supra note 9, at 226.
108 For a typical example of loss of profit flowing from loss of reputation, see
GKN Centrax Gears Ltd. v. Matbro Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 555, 573 (C.A. 1976).
109 "It is usually not possible to offer precise proof of those losses [meaning lost
profits]." BURROWS, supra note 9, at 226.
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loss of goodwill. 110 This decision, however, can be criticized for
failing to discuss the requirements of Article 74 (foreseeability,
for example), which, as has been said, are extremely important
in such situations. 111
Further, English law has identified another type of loss of
profit. This loss of profit flows not from an injury to reputation
but from loss of a chance to enhance reputation. Although cases
addressing this type of loss related mainly to actors 1 2 and au-
thors,113 it is possible to conceive a hypothetical for interna-
tional sales. However, such losses can hardly be proved, let
alone the establishment of foreseeability, causal link, and cer-
tainty (if applicable).
Finally, a case, decided by the Tribunal of International
Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, has raised an interesting aspect of the
"reputation" problem. That is reputation, not of the business-
person, but of its goods. Case No 054/1999114 concerned a con-
tract by installments. The plaintiff claimed loss of profit
suffered as a result of a delay in selling and reduction of prices
of the goods of the second installment. This loss, according to
the plaintiff, was caused by the fact that the goods of the first
installment had been defective, which, in turn, led to the loss of
reputation of the goods on the market. The Tribunal rejected
this claim on several grounds. First, there was no causal link
between the breach and the loss claimed. Second, the plaintiff
did not prove that the amount of the claim was commensurate
to the breach. If damage to reputation had been caused by the
breach, the plaintiff could have been entitled to claim damages
only in the proportion to that which had been caused by the
110 See Helsingin hoviokeus [Court of Appeals] S 00/82, 26 Oct. 2000 (Fin.),
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/001026f5.html.
111 The case contained a dissenting opinion in which foreseeability has been
touched upon. Moreover, the decision can be criticized for having measured dam-
ages according to Finnish law, although the CISG was applicable. This issue is,
however, beyond the scope of this article.
112 See generally Marbe v. George Edwards (Daley's Theatre) Ltd., 1 K.B. 269
(Eng. C.A. 1928); Herbert Clayton v. Oliver, A.C. 209 (H.L. 1930).
113 See generally Tolnay v. Criterion Film Productions Ltd., 2 All E.R. 1625
(K.B. 1936); Joseph v. National Magazine Co. Ltd., 3 All E.R. 52 (Ch. 1959).
114 Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federa-
tion Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 054/1999, 24 Jan. 2000 (Russ.), http:l
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000124rl.html.
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breach. Third, the standard of foreseeability was not
established.
However, it seems that had these conditions been met, the
Tribunal would have allowed damages for loss of profit flowing
from loss of reputation of the goods. Thus, loss of profit flowing
from loss of reputation of the goods is, in principle, recoverable.
The question arises as to the relationship between reputation of
a business manufacturer and reputation of goods, which re-
quires further elaboration. Here, it will be just stated that, in
some cases, reputation of goods may be considered as a separate
category of damages, (separate from reputation of a business-
person) in order to establish the liability in damages.
III. METHODS OF LIMITING DAMAGES
1. General
A principle common to many legal systems is that of limit-
ing the contractual liability of the party in breach. 115 The pur-
pose of this principle is as follows:
[Tihe full compensation of the expectation and reliance interests
would operate either as too strong a disincentive to the assump-
tion of contractual obligations, or to an undue raising of charges
to cover such unlimited liability. 116
The CISG uses a similar approach. It is based on the idea
that the recovery of damages cannot be unlimited. This section
of the article will examine the methods that the CISG provides
in order to achieve this objective, and emphasize the problems
associated with this issue. Additionally, the respective tech-
niques for limitation of damages vary depending on the princi-
ples established in a particular legal system."l7 Further, the
UNIDROIT Principles, in this respect, represent an interesting
example as well: the Principles contain a number of well-known
methods of limitation of damages.
115 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 76.
116 Id. at 143.
117 See generally TREITEL, supra note 8, 143-208.
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2. Foreseeability
One method of limiting damages, which has received exten-
sive application in various legal systems and international acts,
is the principle of foreseeability. 1i s This principle has a long his-
tory. It was first established in Roman law. 119 Much later, it
was established in the Code Napoleon and, consequently,
adopted by a number of legal systems. 120
This rule has been adopted by the common law as well. 121 It
was established in the famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale
122
and further restated in Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v.
Newman Industries, Ltd. 123 The UNIDROIT Principles contain
an analogous provision in Article 7.4.4.124 This rule of for-
seeability constitutes the main manner of limiting damages in
the CISG as well. Namely, the relevant provision provides as
follows:
Damages may not exceed the loss that the party in breach foresaw
or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the con-
tract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew
or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of
contract.125
The purpose of this section of the article is to examine the
CISG's approach to forseeability in comparison to those of other
legal systems. 126
118 See generally Franco Ferrari, Comparative Ruminations on the Foreseeabil-
ity of Damages in Contract Law, 53 LA. L. REV. 1257 (1993). See also TREITEL,
supra note 8, at 150; UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.4 off. cmts.
119 See Ferrari, supra note 118, at 1264.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 1265. See also TREITEL, supra note 8, at 150. This adoption is
said to represent "one of the comparatively rare instances in which a major doc-
trine of the civil law appears to have been taken over in the nineteenth century by
the [clommon law." Id.
122 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
123 2 K.B. 528 (C.A. 1949).
124 "The non-performing party is liable only for harm which it foresaw or could
reasonably have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract as being
likely to result from its non-performance." UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5,
art. 7.4.4.
125 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
126 The main emphasis will be made regarding the English rule on
foreseeability.
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(a) Essential Factors in Evaluation of Foreseeability
(i) Knowledge
According to English law, knowledge is an essential ele-
ment in evaluating foreseeability. Determination of foreseeabil-
ity depends on the knowledge that the parties had at the time of
the conclusion of the contract or, "at all events," the breaching
party had at that time.127 Although under the CISG it is only
the party in breach whose knowledge matters, the position is
analogous. Article 74 states that foreseeability should be estab-
lished "in the light of the facts and matters of which he then
knew or ought to have known." 128 This clearly shows that fore-
seeability should be examined on the basis of the party's knowl-
edge. Thus, determination of foreseeability directly depends on
the party's knowledge. 129
Under English law, knowledge can be of two kinds: imputed
knowledge (which in "the ordinary course of things" is possessed
by any reasonable person regardless of whether the party in
breach actually possesses it or not) and actual knowledge
(which means knowledge the party in breach actually has of
some special circumstances, which lie beyond "the ordinary
course of things").130 Such a division of knowledge into two
types flows from the two parts of the rule established in Hadley
v Baxendale.13 1 The CISG, in turn, does not directly establish
127 See Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Industries, Inc., 2 K.B.
528, 537 (1948).
128 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
129 This statement is supported by some commentators: "[F]oreseeability, as
understood in Article 74, depends on the knowledge of facts and matters which
enable the party concerned to foresee the results of the breach." KNAPP, supra note
23, at 542. See also BERNSTEIN & LoOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 99.
130 See Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Industries, Inc., 2 K.B.
528, 537 (1948).
131 Namely, the rule is that damages "should be, either such as may,
fairly and reasonably be considered arising naturally, i.e.[,] according to
the usual course of things, from the [b]reach of [c]ontract itself, or, such as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
Parties at the time they made the Contract, as the probable result of the
[bireach of it. [If] the special circumstances under which the contract was
actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants and
thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of
such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract
under these special circumstances so known and communicated.
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the two parts of the Hadley rule, which subsequently gave way
to the doctrine of two types of knowledge. However, analogous
subjective and objective standards have been established with
respect to the party's knowledge: "the facts and matters of
which he... knew or ought to have known."132 The text of Arti-
cle 74 of the CISG is likely to address "the ordinary course of
things" as well as "the special circumstances cases."
Generally, knowledge, in the light of an objective standard,
should be imputed to the party in breach if it objectively can be
considered that such knowledge is based on the experience of
the party as a "merchant."133 Moreover, the circumstances of
the concrete case should be taken into account.134
With respect to actual knowledge, based on a subjective
standard, it has been said that "[t]he party in breach will be...
considered as having known the facts and matters enabling him
to foresee the possible consequences of the breach, and there-
fore, as having foreseen them, whenever the other party to the
contract has drawn his attention to such possible consequence
in due time."135 The question then arises: Should the other
party to the contract be the only source that one considers in
evaluating the actual knowledge of the breaching party? It is
not argued that the other party to the contract is, in the context
of a subjective standard, the main source of information. How-
ever, it is not the only available source. It has been correctly
stated that
[mlodern business practices (and equipment), accounting methods
and the extensive communication of information make more
knowledge available to both parties . . . [and] [a] potential
breacher today will have available a great deal more information
about what can happen concerning the contract and hence ought
Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
132 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74 (emphasis added).
133 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 542.
134 See HARVEY MCGREGOR, McGREGOR ON DAMAGES 157 (15th ed., 1988).
135 KNAPP, supra note 23, at 542. In this regard, see Oberlandesgericht [Pro-
vincial Court of Appeal] 2U 30/77, 23 Mar. 1978 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/780323gl.html. This case was decided on the basis of Arti-
cle 82 of the ULIS and the court decided as follows: "The damage resulting as a
consequence of the breach was foreseeable to the buyer at the time of the conclu-
sion of the contract, considering the circumstances, which were familiar to the
buyer .... The [seller] had specifically pointed out the possibility of imminent
damage in case of non-performance." Id.
2002]
29
PACE INT'L L. REV.
to know a great many more facts than a potential breacher in the
nineteenth century.1 3 6
Therefore, in deciding whether the party in breach can be con-
sidered as having known "the facts and matters," a right bal-
ance has to be found in relying on available sources. This
means that we will need to assess the proportion in which each
of the sources of information can be said to have contributed to
the formation of the party's knowledge. However, ultimately,
the specific circumstances of a particular case should be
decisive.
Another way to determine the actual knowledge of a party
is provided in Article 8. In particular, Article 8(2) refers to the
"statements and other conduct" of the party and together with
Article 8(3) provides for the rule of interpretation regarding
statements and conduct of the party.137 These statements and
conduct of the party in breach can sometimes serve as impor-
tant indicators of the knowledge he had at the time of the con-
clusion of the contract.
(ii) Terms of the Contract
It has been said that the foreseeability rule "reflects the
terms of the contract," and therefore "precedence is always
given to the express or implied intentions of the parties which
define those terms.' 138 The terms of the contract, together with
knowledge of the party in breach, are important factors in eval-
uation of foreseeability. Additionally, in case there are hesita-
tions as to the sequence or priority of application of these
elements, precedence should be given to the "express or im-
plied" intentions of the parties with respect to the terms of the
contract. The basis for this statement is Article 6 of the
CISG. 139 It is also to be mentioned that in this context, Article
136 Arthur G. Murphey, Jr., Consequential Damages in Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods and the Legacy of Hadley, 23 GEO WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
415, 452 (1989), available at httpJ/www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/murphey.
html.
137 See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 8(2), 8(3).
138 STOLL, supra note 18, at 555.
139 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 6.
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8 will be the mechanism of determining the intentions and in-
terpreting the respective terms of the contract. 140
However, it is submitted that the above-mentioned state-
ment can bring about the following considerations as well. The
statement that the foreseeability rule "reflects the terms of the
contract" may seem to confine the entire concept of foreseeabil-
ity to the content of the contract. However, it would be better to
say that foreseeability is partly reflected by the terms of the
contract. Besides the contract terms, there are other elements
that are essential in evaluating foreseeability such as knowl-
edge and trade usage. 141 These two elements may or may not be
explicitly reflected in the contract. Accordingly, the party's ac-
tual foresight and the ability to foresee may not always be ex-
plicitly reflected in the contract.
(iii) Trade Usage
It seems that, in some cases, a trade usage can serve as an
additional factor for evaluating foreseeability. For example, in
one case, the German Supreme Court held that subjective and
objective tests in relation to foreseeability1 42 "can be conclu-
sively met by a showing of trade custom as to foreseeability."143
It also follows from this decision that trade usage can be rele-
vant for determining both subjective and objective standards
with respect to foreseeability. This statement, in turn, brings
about some theoretical considerations, which do not seem to
have any practical significance.
Article 9 of the CISG contains both subjective and objective
grounds for applicability of a usage to the parties' legal relation-
140 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8. See also the discussion in section III(2)(a)
(iii) of this article with respect to the importance of Article 8 in determining the
actual knowledge of the party in breach.
141 See the discussion in section III(2)(2)(d) of this article with respect to trade
usage.
142 For a discussion of the two standards in relation to foreseeability, see
section III(2)(d) on Objective and Subjective Standards with Respect to Fore-
seeability.
143 See Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] VIII ZR 210/78, 24 Oct.
1979 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/cases2/791024g1.html. This
case was decided on the basis of Article 82 of the ULIS.
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ships.14 4 It seems that where trade usage is relevant in evalu-
ating foreseeability, the applicability of an objective or a
subjective standard of foreseeability can be linked to the
grounds provided for in Article 9.
If a subjective ground is applicable, i.e., if the parties have
specifically agreed to a particular trade usage, established a
practice between themselves, 145 or knew of a usage, 146 then
such a usage or practice will be likely to determine the actual
knowledge of a party in breach. It follows that actual knowl-
edge can establish the actual foresight. But, the fact that a
party actually knew of something does not necessarily mean
that he actually foresaw its consequences. Actual knowledge
can lead to the establishment of an objective standard, i.e., that
a party, having known of certain conditions, was in a position to
foresee the consequences of the breach, but did not in fact fore-
see them.
If an objective ground for applicability of a usage comes into
play, then this ground is likely to impute the knowledge of the
party in breach. 147 Provided that a party did not actually pos-
sess the knowledge, the imputed knowledge will be more likely
to lead to determination of an objective foreseeability ("ought to
have foreseen"), rather than of an actual foresight. The reason
for this conclusion is that it is highly unlikely that a party will
actually foresee the consequences if he does not possess the req-
uisite knowledge.
144 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 9. See also WERNER JUNGE, COMMENTARY ON
THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 76-77 (Peter
Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas trans., 2d ed. 1998).
145 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(1).
146 "The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly
made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties
knew." CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(2).
147 "The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly
made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties...
ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular
trade concerned." CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(2).
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(b) Whose Foreseeability?
Article 74 makes it clear that it is only the party in breach
who is required to foresee or to be in a position to foresee. 148
The position is somewhat different in English law. In particu-
lar, in Hadley v. Baxendale, the requirement was that the loss
be in the contemplation of both parties.149 It seems, however,
that this divergence will not produce any substantial differ-
ences between the applications of the two rules. 50 The reason
is that it is the breaching party whose foreseeability matters
because it is almost always that "the plaintiff knows his busi-
ness and circumstances better than the defendant."151
(c) Relevant Time for Evaluation of Foreseeability
In English law, the relevant time for evaluating foresee-
ability is generally the time of making the contract. 15 2 This rule
"is well settled and has proved remarkably resistant to
change."153
The position is the same in the CISG. Article 74 directly
refers to "the time of the conclusion of the contract." 54 In gen-
148 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 74. For the misapplication of this provision,
see Delchi Carrier, SpA, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12820 *12 (where it was stated
that the loss should not exceed the amount "reasonably envisioned by the parties").
See generally Eric C. Schneider, Consequential Damages in the International Sale
of Goods: Analysis of Two Decisions, 16 J. INT'L Bus. LAw 615 (1996), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/articles/schnedr2.html. For the correct
application of this provision, see Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration
at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 155/1994, 16 Mar.
1995 (Russ.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950316rl.html,
cited in ROZENBERG, supra note 98. The tribunal of the Moscow Commercial Arbi-
tration provided, inter alia, that the defendant ought to have foreseen the possibil-
ity of loss as possible unfavourable consequences of the breach of his obligations.
Id.
149 See generally Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). The idea un-
derlying this rule is "to emphasize that the contemplation by the plaintiff was not
enough to satisfy the test of remoteness." TREITEL, supra note 8, at 159.
150 See Murphey, supra note 136, at 447.
151 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREA-
TISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW (1964), cited in Murphey, supra
note 136, at 147.
152 See generally Hadley v Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); Victoria Laun-
dry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Industries, Inc., 2 K.B. 528 (1948). For the discus-
sion of this rule in English and American law, see TREITEL, supra note 8, at 160-61.
See also Murphey, supra note 136.
153 TREITEL, supra note 8, at 160.
154 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
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eral, this issue in the CISG seems to be "problem-free." The
only point that this work will emphasize is that the time of the
conclusion of the contract is an important factor in assessing
foreseeability because other important elements of foreseeabil-
ity, such as knowledge of the party in breach or certain circum-
stances of the case, will be examined only within the limits of
this particular period of time. Therefore, precision in relation to
the time becomes very important. In this regard, it has been
correctly stated that the "negotiating leading to the conclusion
of the contract may . . .last a certain period of time."1 55 The
correct view seems to be that foreseeability status be evaluated
at the time when "the contract came into being"156 or entered
into legal force. This approach is in line with that taken in some
legal systems where the conclusion of the contract is the basis of
its entry into legal force. 157
It also is to be noted that, since the moment of entry into
legal force is decisive in evaluating foreseeability, careful atten-
tion should be paid to the requirements of some legal systems
predetermining the entry of the contracts into legal force. This
statement is primarily relevant to those countries that have cer-
tain requirements as to the form of the contracts, rules on state
registration of the contracts, and made a reservation under Ar-
ticle 96 of the CISG. s58 The Russian Federation, for example,
has made a reservation under this Article 159 and provides for
certain requirements with respect to the form of external eco-
nomic transactions. 160
Thus, the moment of the conclusion of the contract, the mo-
ment of its entry into legal force is the decisive time in deter-
155 See KNAPP, supra note 2, at 542.
156 Id.
157 For example, in accordance with Article 357 of the Civil Code of the Repub-
lic of Uzbekistan, the contract enters into force and becomes binding on the parties
from the moment of its conclusion. See CODE CML [C. civ.] art. 357 (Uzb.) (trans.
by D. Saidov).
158 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 96, Commentary on Article Declarations.
159 Since the Russian Federation is a successor of the USSR's obligations
under the CISG they have adopted the reservation.
160 See generally ROZENBERG, supra note 98. See also BRAGINSK1Y & VITRYAN-
slrY, supra note 30, at 274. Article 1181 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Uzbek-
istan provides for the external economic transaction with a participation of a
national of the Republic of Uzbekistan to be made in writing. See CODE CrviL [C.
crv.] art. 1181 (Uzb.).
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mining a party's foreseeability. Foreseeability that takes place
after this moment should have no legal consequences. 161
(d) Objective and Subjective Standards with Respect to
Foreseeability
In English law, we have seen the manifestation of objective
and subjective standards with respect to the knowledge, which
has been established as an essential element for evaluation of
foreseeability. 16 2 What are the standards with respect to the
foreseeability test itself?
The first part of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale has been
interpreted to mean the objective standard, i.e., "the defendant
is liable for loss which any reasonable person in his position
could have foreseen."1 63 The second part of the rule was con-
strued as a "mixture" of two elements: "the defendant is liable
for loss which could have been foreseen by a reasonable person
with the same knowledge of special circumstances as the defen-
dant had."164 The same commentator, stating the fact that the
objective element enters into the second part of the rule, gives
an example of two views with respect to this fact.' 65 The first
view is that "the rule applies not only where the defendant
knew of the special circumstances, but also where he had rea-
son to know."' 66 At that, reference is, inter alia, made to Article
74 of the CISG.167 It is correct that the CISG provides for both
standards with respect to foreseeability168 : "foresaw or ought to
have foreseen."169 But the difference between the provision in
the CISG and English law, in this respect, is that Article 74
strictly divides these two standards. Within the rule, the two
standards do not "enter into each other." Whereas, in English
161 See KNAPP, supra note 23 at 542.
162 But see generally Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Industries,
Inc., 2 K.B. 528 (1948) (where there was no direct reference to such standards, the
division onto the actual and imputed knowledge, in essence, seems to be the mani-
festation of these standards) Id.
163 TREITEL, supra note 8, at 155.
164 Id.
165 See id.
166 Id. at 155-56.
167 See id. at 156, n. 74.
168 The CISG also provides for both standards in terms of knowledge.
169 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
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law, it has been shown that both elements are present in the
second part of the rule.
However, even though there is a strict division of standards
in Article 74, both of them are equally applicable. In order to
determine foreseeability, it will be sufficient to prove either that
a party actually foresaw the loss or was objectively in a position
to foresee it.170 Therefore, it is not necessary to prove that the
party in breach actually foresaw the loss.1 7 1 The proof of an ob-
jective element will be sufficient to make the party liable for
loss. 172 However, such liability may "be restricted on the basis
of a reasonable allocation of risks under the contract."17 3 In
particular, it may follow explicitly or implicitly from the terms
of the contract that certain losses should not be covered by the
party's liability, even though they were foreseen or objectively
foreseeable. 174
(e) What Must Be Foreseen?
The foreseeability, in Article 74, directly refers to "the loss
.. . as a possible consequence of the breach of contract."1 75
Therefore, it is the (amount of) loss that must be foreseen. 176 At
that, most leading commentators agree that Article 74 does not
require the foreseeability of the precise amount of loss. 7 7 The
loss is said to be foreseeable "if the risk that has actually mate-
rialized is essentially the same as the risk which was foresee-
170 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 541.
171 See id.
172 See id. See also STOLL, supra note 18, at 568. A good example of the
method the court used to establish the applicability of an objective standard is
found in Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] VIII ZR 210/78, 24 Oct. 1979
(F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisglwais/db/cases2/791024gl.html. In or-
der to come to a conclusion, the court of a lower instance relied
on a written inquiry to the Industrial and Trade Association of Dusseldorf
and the German-Dutch Trade Association regarding the state of mind of
merchants in [the field in question] ... as to whether a Dutch exporter in
December 1976, who is to deliver cheese to a German importer would
break off business if three percent of the goods delivered by the Dutch
importer were defective.
Id.
173 STOLL, supra note 18, at 568.
174 See id.
175 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74. See also KNAPP, supra note 23, at 541.
176 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 541.
177 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 569 (with further reference to Rabel). See also
KNAPP, supra note 23, at 541.
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able at the time of the conclusion of the contract."178 The crucial
question, however, is what concrete factors must the party in
breach foresee or ought to have foreseen to be liable for the loss?
The first such factor is the possibility of the loss.' 79 This
conclusion flows directly from Article 74, which provides that
the loss must be foreseen as "a possible consequence of the
breach."8 0 There is no doubt that the risk of loss is directly
related to the potential loss. Therefore, the second factor, which
the party had to foresee or ought to have foreseen, is the type of
the loss.18 1 It is further submitted that foreseeability should re-
late also to the possible extent of the loss (the third factor).' 8 2
The breaching party should not be held liable for the full extent
of the loss if he could not have reasonably foreseen or was not in
the position to foresee the extent that would follow from the
type of the loss that he foresaw or ought to have foreseen. The
party should be liable only for the losses that he reasonably
foresaw or ought to have foreseen as the possible extent of the
loss. It also is to be noted that in evaluating the possible extent
of the loss, the manner in which the loss was caused, or the
events that led to the loss having acquired the extent in ques-
tion, often can be decisive. Therefore, arguably, these aspects
can be regarded as necessary factors that a party had to foresee
or ought to have foreseen to be liable for the extent of the loss in
question.
178 STOLL, supra note 18, at 569.
179 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 567.
180 For the sake of comparison, English law requires damages to be contem-
plated as "a probable result." A similar approach is reflected in the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), supra note 10, 351. It is clear that these rules require a certain degree
of probability. The CISG, in turn, "widens the area of liability imposed upon a
breaching party." In other words, the CISG is more "severe" toward the party in
breach, in this respect. It is sufficient that the party in breach foresaw or ought to
have foreseen the loss only as a "possible consequence of the breach." Murphey,
supra note 136, at 420.
181 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 569.
182 "[Aln attempt to restrict the notion of foreseeability solely to the type of loss
and to exclude the extent of the loss from consideration is unconvincing: if the
extent of the loss considerably exceeds what was foreseeable, then a risk has mate-
rialized which is different from the risk which was foreseeable." Id.
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3. Causation
Another method of limiting damages, which is used by
some legal systems, is that of causation.18 3 The discussion, in
this section, will concentrate on this issue in the framework of
the CISG.
Article 74 provides that only damages for such loss as has
been "suffered ... as a consequence of the breach," are recover-
able.'8 4 Therefore, it is apparent that there is a requirement as
to the presence of a causal link between the breach and the
loss. 18 5 The concept of causation in different legal systems gave
rise to the development of various "theories" 8 6 of causation.
8 7
Does the causal link, established in Article 74, leave us any
room for developing the "theoretical background," which would
underpin it? Will there be a need to do so?
Some commentators believe that since the foreseeability
rule is used, there can be no room for further theoretical devel-
opment of the issue of causation.'88 Others merely avoid the
question, laying everything on the foreseeability rule.'8 9 The
major implication of these views seems to be that the foresee-
183 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 162. See also BRAGINSKIY & VITRYANSKIY,
supra note 30, at 575-76 (discussing causation in the Civil Law of Russian Federa-
tion); G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT, 879-81 (9th ed., 1995); McGREGOR,
supra note 134, at 138-43 (on causation in English law).
184 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
185 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 540. See also STOLL, supra note 8, at 558;
BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 98; UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5,
art. 7.4.2 cmts.
186 H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORR, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 432-33 (2d ed. 1985).
The term "theories of causation" has been criticized on the ground that it implies
an attempt to develop a scientific theory, while these authors believe that the "the-
ories" represent "conceptual, not empirical investigation." Id.
187 See generally HART & HONORk, supra note 186, 79-123, 277-92, 381-442.
See also BRAGINSKIY & VITRYANSKIY, supra note 30, at 576-80; TREITEL, supra note
8, at 162-73; JOFFE, supra note 30, at 113-28.
188 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 558.
The Convention has no room for legal theories of causation which limit
liability for damage to probable or not entirely remote causal sequence of
events, since it employs the foreseeability rule (Article 74) in order to ex-
clude liability for damage which is so remote as to lie outside the scope of
a party's responsibility.
Id. (emphasis added).
189 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 540.
As to causality, it may be questioned whether the party in breach is liable
only for the loss caused to the injured party by a direct causality or
whether his liability extends to losses by indirect causality. There is no
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ability rule excludes the possibility of theoretical development
of causal problems. This article does not support this position.
In order to express my view of this problem, the article shall
examine the relationship between the two concepts. Is foresee-
ability capable of fully replacing the potential scope of the con-
cept of causation?
There can be no doubt that these two concepts strongly
overlap. Their close inter-connection has given rise to confusion
in different legal systems. The confusion primarily manifests
itself in the fact that foreseeability has been used to establish
the causal connection. 190 For example, in American legal litera-
ture, it has been stated that the only test of causation was fore-
seeability. 191 A Swiss author, in defining the theory of
adequate causation, essentially, used a foreseeability rule. 192
Such confusion is said to take place even in France, where the
two requirements are provided for in separate articles of the
Civil Code. 193
Thus, it is recognized that foreseeability and causation are
closely related and it hardly seems possible to separate them.
However, such a connection cannot serve as a basis for consider-
ing the two concepts as mutually exclusive. Nor is it correct to
regard foreseeability as, at least on a theoretical level, fully re-
placing the potential "effect" of causation.
The concept of causation requires some examination. It can
be defined as a "sequence of classes of complex events or condi-
tions"194 or an objective connection between the events. 195 In
legal science and practice, causation is used either for establish-
ing both the existence of liability and the extent of liability or for
determining just one of these elements. 196 First, this method
explicit answer to this question in the Convention. A working solution may
be found by applying the criterion of foreseeability.
Id. (emphasis added).
190 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 153.
191 See CORBIN, supra note 151, at 70.
192 "A loss is considered to be caused by an event if the event is appropriate to
bring it about and if a third person in the light of general experience and with
knowledge of all the facts could have foreseen the possibility of loss." TREITEL,
supra note 8, at 153.
193 See id. See also CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] arts. 1150, 1151 (Fr.).
194 HART & HONORk, supra note 186, at 44 (with further reference to Mill).
195 See GRAZHDANSKOYE PRAvo, supra note 93, at 570.
196 See HART & HONORP, supra note 186, at 84-85.
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artificially limits the "range of events" (otherwise, the events,
which we identify as cause and effect, will go away to infinity
into two opposite directions). 197 Then, one of the following ques-
tions will need to be answered: (a) What caused the event in
question? or (b) Is the causal link between the two events in
question sufficient to establish either liability or the required
extent of liability? In order to answer either of these questions
one of the "theories" of causation is used. In answering the first
question, we identify one event (breach, for example) out of all
preceding events, which contributed to the arising of the event
in question (loss, for example) as the cause. In answering the
second question, we determine whether there is a required
causal connection between one preceding event (breach) and a
subsequent event in question (loss). If a causal connection, re-
quired by a particular theory of causation, is found, then the
event in question (loss) can be considered as having been caused
by one of the preceding events (breach).
On the basis of this view of the concept of causation, this
article will emphasize three main reasons why, in theory, fore-
seeability cannot fully serve as a substitution for causation.
The first reason is that these two methods generally should
be used at different stages. As mentioned above, causation arti-
ficially establishes the range of events and determines the
causal connection between the events. Once this has been done,
foreseeability is applied to determine the limits to the conse-
quences to which liability would have extended had causation
alone been applied. In other words, foreseeability limits liabil-
ity to something less than the loss, which the breach is said to
have caused.'9 8 Therefore, the foreseeability rule generally
should serve as a final "cut-off' of liability.
However, this may not always be the case. In rare cases, it
is causation that should be the "cut-off' of liability (second rea-
son). Contrary to the view that development of the theory of
causation is irrelevant within the framework of the CISG, 199
197 See BRAGINSKIY & VITRYANSKIY, supra note 30, at 580 (with further refer-
ence to Shershenevich).
198 See HART & HONORt, supra note 186, at 255-56.
199 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 558. "It suffices that breach was a condition of
the occurrence of the harmful event ... [and] [accordingly] [Wt is irrelevant
whether the damage was caused directly or indirectly by the breach." Id.
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there may be situations where foreseeability alone will not be
capable of dealing with the problem of limiting liability. This
may occur in situations where, in addition to the breach, there
is another event (or events) that equally could have led to the
occurrence of the loss that the breach is said to have caused.
Imagine that it is extremely difficult to establish the real cause
of the loss:20 0 was it the breach or was it that other event(s)? At
that, the party in breach foresaw or was in the position to fore-
see the possibility, the type, and the possible extent of the loss
because this loss ought to have been foreseen as a possible con-
sequence of the breach. It seems that, in this type of situation,
a certain approach to treatment of causal problems may be
necessary.
Third, it can be argued that causation should be estab-
lished "through" foreseeability. For example, one author has
stated:
The living conviction of... [a] ... man.., that there is uniformity
in the sequence of events, that we can in good measure predict the
future from the past, and that we can in some degree ourselves
control the future, is all that we are expressing when we assert
the relation of cause and effect. 20 1
Indeed, foreseeability largely consists of an element of cau-
sation. Without an understanding of how events can affect each
other and of "a degree of uniformity of sequence of events," it
would be impossible to foresee anything whatsoever. However,
causation as a phenomenon exists on its own regardless of our
knowledge of the world. It is an objective phenomenon. 20 2
Therefore, it seems incorrect to bring an objective process,
which exists independently of our perception of the world, en-
tirely down to the way a person could foresee the potential
causal processes. The foreseeability rule under the CISG in-
cludes both subjective and objective standards. The way a per-
son actually had foreseen or been in the position to foresee the
200 See generally Mash & Murrell, Ltd. v. Joseph I. Emanuel, Ltd., 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 326 (C.A. 1961) (where it could not have been established with certainty what
had caused the deterioration of potatoes).
201 CORBIN, supra note 151, at 69.
202 Although some authors assert that, in certain circumstances, a state of
mind may be relevant in deciding the causation issues. See HART & HONORP,
supra note 186, at 436.
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potential development of events, at the time of the conclusion of
the contract, does not necessarily coincide with the way such a
development has, in fact, taken place. In determining liability
or the extent of liability, we need to rely on an objective se-
quence of events, and not on the way a person foresaw or ought
to have foreseen that sequence. As mentioned above, foresee-
ability generally should be used after an objective sequence of
events has been established.
Thus, in theory, foreseeability cannot serve as a substitute
for causation. In support of this view, it also should be noted
that some legal systems employ both these methods and in spite
of the confusion, which sometimes takes place, do not regard
the use of foreseeability as excluding the possibility of theoreti-
cal development of causal problems. 20 3 Rather, these concepts
should supplement and balance each other. As has been cor-
rectly stated by one author, "[the] doctrines on foreseeability
and.. .causation could be applied in a rather consistent manner
and Art. 74 is certainly flexible enough to accommodate an ap-
plication of [these] general principles."20 4
The next question is whether there will be a need for the
theories of causation? With respect to contractual liability, the
issues of causation are more theoretical, rather than of practical
importance. 20 5 International sales transactions, as a rule, will
be based on contractual relationships, and, in essence, the
statement above will be applicable to them. Therefore, the
203 For example, the French legal system employs both these principles. See
TREITEL, supra note 8, at 153, 167-68.
204 JAN RAMBERG, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 126 (2d ed.
2000).
205 In the first place, the harm for which compensation is to be paid in the
law of contract is usually economic rather than physical, and establishing
'causal connection' between breach of contract and economic loss ... also
involves a different relation, viz. that of failing to provide a person with
the opportunities for gain. Secondly, the causal or near-causal problems
which arise in actions for breach of contract are often relatively simple in
comparison with the difficulty of determining the scope of the duty to pay
damages, so that attention has been concentrated on the latter .... Fi-
nally, liability in contract is more often based on the notion of risk than in
tort: a defendant is then obliged to pay compensation for having, by a
breach of contract, provided the occasion for harm, though he would not
ordinarily be said to have caused it.
HART & HONOR2, supra note 186, at 576. See also BRAGINSKIY & VITRYANSKIY,
supra note 30, at 576.
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problems connected with the issues of causation hardly will re-
present any practical significance. In many cases it will be pos-
sible to dispense with an examination of causal issues by using
the foreseeability standard only. However, we cannot exclude
such a possibility. Therefore, it is important to emphasize the
types of cases in which causal problems may be relevant. 20 6
First, the cases related to damage to property caused by defec-
tive goods could be of relevance. 20 7 These cases seem to be gov-
erned by the Convention. 20 Second, causal issues may be
relevant in the situations where an injured party had to incur
expenses as a result of the breach.209 The third case, where
causation may be of importance, is where the party has been
deprived of the loss of profit.210
Thus, it is suggested that at least, on a level of theoretical
considerations, and for the sake of those rare cases where cau-
sation may be relevant, the development of methods of treating
causal problems under the CISG should be carried out.
4. Mitigation of Loss
The next method of limiting damages, which is used in the
CISG, is the principle of mitigating loss. 211 Some legal sys-
206 For the cases where the presence of a causal link has been considered, see
Schiedsgericht der Handelskammer [Arbitral Tribunal] 21 Mar. 1996 (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgwais/db/cases2/960321gl.html. See also Lan-
dgericht [District Court] 7b 0 142/75, 25 May 1977 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.
pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/770524gl.html; Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme
Court] VIII ZR 121/98, 24 Mar. 1999 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
wais/db/cases2/990324gl.html; (Sacovini/M Marazza v. Les fils de Henris Ramel)
Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court] 173 P/B 93-16.542, 23 Jan. 1996, (Fr.), http:l/
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/960123fl.html; Tribunal of Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, 155/1994, 16 Mar. 1995 (Russ.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
wais/db/cases2/950316rl.html.
207 See HART & HONORE, supra note 186, at 310, 314.
208 "Since the Convention does not exclude claims for damage to property, it
would follow that such claims, if they otherwise fall within the Convention, would
be governed by the Convention." WARREN L. KHOO, INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION OF CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 50 (Nina M. Galston and Hans Smit, eds. 1984). See ROLF HERBER, COM-
MENTARY ON THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG)
50 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas, trans. 2d ed. 1998).
209 In common law, these expenses are usually referred to as "incidental ex-
penses." See HART & HONORP, supra note 186, at 310-11, 314-16.
210 See id. at 311-12, 316-21.
211 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 77.
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tems 212 and international documents 2 13 provide for this method
as well.
(a) Meaning, Purpose and Status of the "Mitigation"
Provision
The central idea underlying the principle of mitigating loss
is that the aggrieved party cannot recover damages, with re-
spect to loss, that he reasonably could have avoided. 214 The
purpose of this principle is to prevent the injured party from
passively waiting for the loss to take place and then suing the
party in breach for this loss when the injured party could have
avoided such loss. 215 From the economic point of view, it has
been said that it is "unreasonable ... to permit an increase in
harm, which could have been reduced by the taking of reasona-
ble steps."216 In the CISG, this principle is reflected in Article
77 and has been formulated as follows:
A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such mea-
sures as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss,
including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to
take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in
the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been
mitigated. 217
The requirement of mitigating loss pertains only to the in-
jured party's right to damages. 218 It follows from Article 77 that
if the aggrieved party fails to mitigate, the party in breach will
have the right to claim reduction in damages by the amount
212 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 179.
213 See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.8(1). Article 7.4.8(1)
states: "The non-performing party is not liable for harm suffered by the aggrieved
party to the extent that the harm could have been reduced by the latter party's
taking reasonable steps." Id.
214 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 179. See also STOLL, supra note 18, at 586;
KNAPP, supra note 23, at 559-60; Sutton, supra note 18, at 748; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND), supra note 10, 127; OGUS, supra note 12, at 322; A.G. GUEST ET AL., BENJA-
MIN'S SALE OF GOODS 864 (5th ed. 1997); McGREGOR, supra note 134, at 168;
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.8 cmts.
215 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 559-60. See also UNIDROIT Principles, supra
note 5, art. 7.4.8 off. cmts.
216 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.8 off. cmts.
217 CISG, supra note 1, art. 77.
218 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 587.
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that could have been avoided. 219 The failure to mitigate will not
affect the injured party's claim for other remedies. 220 The only
exception is said to be the case where it was reasonable to ex-
pect the injured party to carry out certain actions, for example,
in the form of avoidance of the contract or of the conclusion of a
cover transaction 221 in order to mitigate the loss. 2 22
Regarding the amount, by which the damages should be re-
duced, the following formula is to be followed:
1. The full amount of damages should be calculated. This should
be done according to the rules provided for in Articles 74-76;
2. The amount of loss, which should have been avoided, should be
established;
3. The second amount should be deducted from the first.2 23
Another issue, which needs to be considered, is the "status" of
Article 77. It has been an obligation on the injured party: "[a]
party ... must take such measures."224 But does it really re-
present an obligation as such?
Some sources state that the provision in Article 77 is one of
several provisions of the Convention (together with Articles 85-
88) that provide for a "duty owed by the injured party to the
party in breach. ,225 On the other hand, it has been stated that
under this provision the injured party "is under an 'obligation to
herself to mitigate her loss."226 It seems that both of these
opinions cannot be fully accepted as correct.
First, an obligation can be defined as a legal relationship,
by virtue of which one party is entitled to demand from the
other party the performance of certain actions. 227 Based on Ar-
219 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 77.
220 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 561. See also STOLL, supra note 18, at 587;
CISG, supra note 1, art. 73; Secretariat Commentary on Article 73 of the 1978
Draft, Commentary on the Draft Convention Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5, available at http:l/
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgltext/secomm/secomm-77.html [hereinafter Secretariat
Commentary on Article 73].
221 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 586-87.
222 See id.
223 KNAPP, supra note 23, at 562.
224 CISG, supra note 1, art. 77.
225 CISG, supra note 1, art. 73. See also Secretariat Commentary on Article
73, supra note 220 (emphasis added).
226 BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 103.
227 See JOFFE, supra note 30, at 6.
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ticle 77, the breaching party cannot demand from the injured
party performance of his "duty." Therefore, the injured party
does not owe such a "duty" to the party in breach.
Second, we cannot, properly speaking, refer to mitigation
as "an obligation to herself." It would contradict the essence of'
an obligation as a legal concept 228 and, consequently, the party
"cannot owe a duty to himself."229
Thus, we can see that even if it is possible to refer to miti-
gation using such terms as a "duty" or an "obligation,"230 the
nature of this "duty" is substantially different from other obliga-
tions under the CISG.231 In fact, it does not represent a con-
tractual obligation.232 There are two principal reasons for such
a conclusion.
The first reason has already been touched upon, but will be
reiterated again: the "duty" under Article 77 does not represent
a legal relationship between the parties, which gives one party
the right to demand a certain action from the other.
Second, the breach of an obligation is the basis for liability
under the Convention. 233 However, the breach of the "duty" to
mitigate will not give rise to any form of liability under the
CISG. 234 Non-compliance with Article 77 will entail the loss by
the injured party of the right to claim those damages, which
could have been avoided. 235 Therefore, the view that Article 77
can lead to the development of a general principle that would
establish a duty of "loyalty to the other party to the contract,"
228 See definition of legal concept in section III(4)(a) of the article.
229 McGREGOR, supra note 134, at 172.
230 The terminology duty and obligation has been criticized. See TREITEL,
supra note 8, at 179. See also McGREGOR, supra note 134, at 172.
231 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 562.
232 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 556. See also BERNSTEIN & LoOKOFSKY, supra
note 3, at 102.
233 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 556.
234 See id. See also KNAPP, supra note 23, at 562; TREITEL, supra note 8 at 179;
Delchi Carrier SpA, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12820 at *13 (for the misconstruction of
this provision where article 77 was interpreted as requiring mitigation); Schnei-
der, supra note 148.
235 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 77. See also STOLL, supra note 18, at 586. See,
e.g., (Internationale Jute Maatschappij BV v. Marin Palomares S.L.) Tribunal
Supremo [Supreme Court] 454/2000, 28 Jan. 2000 (Spain), http://www.cisg.law.
pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000128s4.html (where the seller's damages claim was
reduced by the amount, which could have been avoided).
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the breach of which results in damages,236 is not supported in
this article. 237
In one respect, however, it seems that the "duty" to miti-
gate may represent the basis for refusal to enforce the party's
right to specific performance. 238 Nevertheless, even in that con-
text, this provision should not be construed as an obligation in a
legal sense. Instead, its function will be the prevention of the
party exercising his right to remedy with specific
performance. 239
The opinion that the "duty" to mitigate is not an obligation
in a legal sense is in line with the approach taken in English
law. The relevant position has been formulated as follows: "A
plaintiff is under no duty to mitigate his loss, despite the habit-
ual use by the lawyers of the phrase 'duty to mitigate.' He is
completely free to act as he judges to be in his best interests."240
(b) Reasonable Measures
According to Article 77, measures to mitigate loss must be
reasonable in the circumstances concerned. 241 The type of mea-
sures that need to be undertaken depends on the criterion of
reasonableness.242 The latter, in turn, depends on and will be
construed in the light of the circumstances in question. 243 In
general, it has been said that a measure is reasonable "if under
the particular circumstances, it could be expected to be taken by
236 See Schneider, supra note 18, at 237; ULRICH MAGNUS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF UN-SALES LAw 59 (3-4) RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT (Lisa Haberfellner trans. 1995),
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgbiblio/magnus.html.
237 This opinion can be supported by BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at
103 n.147.
238 See section III(4)(c) for a discussion on mitigation in case of an anticipatory
breach.
239 See HONNOLD, supra note 73, at 518.
240 Sotiros Shipping Inc. v. Sameiet Solholt (The "Solholt"), 1 Lloyd's Rep. 605
(C.A. 1983), cited in McGREGOR, supra note 134, at 172; Accord RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND), supra note 10, 127.
241 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 77.
242 The criterion of reasonableness with respect to measures of mitigating is
also used by some legal systems as well as by the UNIDROIT Principles. See
GUEST, supra note 214, at 864-65. See also McGREGOR, supra note 134, at 171;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, 350(2); UNIDROIT Principles, supra
note 5, art. 7.4.8(1).
243 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 560. See also STOLL, supra note 18, at 588.
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a person acting in good faith,"244 or if it is "adequate" and pre-
ventive with respect to the loss. 245 In evaluating the situation,
one also should consider the party's skills and position as a bus-
inessman, for example, "ingenuity, experience, and financial re-
sources," etc.246 Relevant trade usage, if any, should be taken
into account as well. 247 The aggrieved party is not obligated to
take measures that, in the circumstances concerned, are "exces-
sive"248 and entail unreasonably high expenses and risks. 249 An
aggrieved party can refrain from such measures and still com-
ply with Article 77. 250
What types of measures are addressed in Article 77? Arti-
cle 77 provides that the measures should be aimed at mitigation
of "the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the
breach. '251 Following Article 74, this provision refers to all
kinds of loss. It is understandable that, in practice, different
types of loss can give rise to a great variety of situations. Con-
sequently, the decision on how and in what way an injured
party should have mitigated his loss can be made only on the
basis of carefully examining all circumstances of a concrete situ-
244 STOLL, supra note 18, at 588. It seems that this approach to construction of
reasonableness of a measure was taken by Supreme Court of Austria Oberster
Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] 10 Ob 518/95, 6 Feb. 1996 (Aus.), http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/960206a3.html. Namely, the court stated, "[a]
possible measure to reduce damages is reasonable, if it could have been expected
as bona fides conduct from a reasonable person in the position of the claimant
under the same circumstances." Id.
245 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 560.
246 BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 103.
247 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 588. See also CISG, supra note 1, art. 9.
248 KNAPP, supra note 23, at 560.
249 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 588. This conclusion can be supported by the
view taken by an Australian court. In particular, the court has stated that
the obligation to mitigate did not require seller to put at risk its commer-
cial reputation by taking technical points to avoid its obligation under its
agreement to charter a vessel when the owner accepted its intimation that
it would charter the vessel and become liable under terms eventually to be
formalised in the unlikely event that they had not been formalised prior to
seller's termination of the contract.
(Downs Investments Pty Ltd v Perwaja Steel) Supreme Court of Queensland, Civ.
J. No. 10680, 17 Nov. 2000 (Austl.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisglwais/db/
cases2/001117a2.html.
250 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 560.
251 CISG, supra note 1, art. 77. The position, in this respect, is different in
English law, which refers to mitigation of damages, not of loss. See MICHAEL
BRIDGE, INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: LAw AND PRACTICE 105 (1999).
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ation, criterion of reasonableness, and the type of loss in ques-
tion. Therefore, it does not seem possible to list every single
measure that is implied in this provision.
However, in order to illustrate the wide range of possible
mitigating measures, some examples will be given. Mitigation
can, for instance, have the form of making a substitute transac-
tion (resale or repurchase);252 avoiding a contract;253 finding a
sub-contractor; 254 expediting shipment of goods that have not
been purchased in a cover transaction;255 sub-chartering a ves-
sel;256 or contacting a party in breach and submitting the docu-
ments, proving the claim, in order to receive necessary
information, which could help in mitigating the loss. 257
Further, it is also worth noting that an oddity can be dis-
covered in some cases of mitigation. The problem is that, some-
252 See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht [Provincial Court of Appeal] 17 U 146/93, 14
Jan. 1994 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/940114gl.
htm. See also (Metal Concentrate) Court of Arbitration of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce 8574 (ICC 1996), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/
cases2 /968574il.html; (Steel Bars) Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce 6281 (ICC 1989), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/
db/cases2/ 980902gl.html; Oberlandesgericht [Provincial Court of Appeal] 3 U 246/
97, 2 Sept. 1998 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/
980902gl.html). In international sales, this measure seems to be the "usual" form
of mitigation. See STOLL, supra note 18, at 588. Additionally, the importance of
this measure has been emphasised in the context of the loss of profit. In particular,
it has been stated, "[the] requirement [to make a substitute transaction] must be
considered, especially where a substitute transaction would avoid consequential
losses following the non- or defective performance of the contract (e.g., claim by a
buyer for loss of profit)." Id.
253 See Oberlandesgericht [Provincial Court of Appeal] 7 U 1720/94, 8 Feb.
1995 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.eduicisg/wais/db/cases2/950208gl.htm
(where the court has stated, "as the [seller] never avoided the contract, it had dis-
regarded its duty to mitigate its loss"). See also RAMBERG, supra note 204, at 159.
254 See (Nova Tool & Mold Inc. v. London Industries Inc.) Ontario Court of Ap-
peal, C31315, 26 Jan. 2000 (Can.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/
cases2/000126c1.html.
255 See Delchi Carrier SpA, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12820 at *13 (N.D.N.Y.
1994).
256 See (Downs Investments Pty Ltd v Perwaja Steel) Supreme Court of Queen-
sland, Civ. J. No. 10680, 17 Nov. 2000 (Austl.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg
wais/db/cases2/001117a2.html.
257 See Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Fed-
eration Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 054/1999, 24 Jan. 2000 (Russ.),
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000124rl.html. See also RAM-
BERG, supra note 204, at 131. In some cases, this measure can be rather impor-
tant, because "[slometimes it may also be possible for [one party] to inform the
[other party] what he could himself do to mitigate his loss." Id.
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times, mitigation itself can bring about certain forms of loss. 258
In other words, mitigation can be the source of loss. In taking
certain mitigating measures, an injured party may have to in-
cur a number of different expenses such as the costs of storage,
repair costs, or brokerage costs. Is it required and is it possible
to mitigate this type of loss, or, in other words, to mitigate a
measure aimed at mitigation? It is argued that the wording of
Article 77 is broad enough to cover this situation, and therefore
requires mitigating this type of loss as well. It also is submitted
that it is not impossible to mitigate this kind of loss. For exam-
ple, suppose that the buyer informs the seller that he will not be
able to accept delivery and pay for the goods. The contract has
been avoided, and the seller mitigates his loss by reselling the
goods. At that, in such a cover sale, the seller had to incur a
certain amount of brokerage costs. If it can be proved that it
was reasonable to avoid these brokerage costs, then these costs
should not be included in the claim. Likewise, if it were reason-
able to incur a lesser amount of brokerage costs, then the claim
should be reduced. Finally, it should be said that since these
damages can be caused by a diverse number of situations, the
measures preventing this loss would vary accordingly.
(c) Mitigation of Loss in Case of an Anticipatory Breach
It has been said that "one challenging area for the prospec-
tive operation of the duty to mitigate" is its applicability with
respect to an anticipatory breach. 259 Is there a duty to mitigate
in connection with an anticipatory breach and, if so, can mea-
sures to mitigate be applied in such a case? This question re-
quires some examination.
It has been stated that the "duty" to mitigate should apply
in the case of an anticipatory breach of contract. 260 Generally,
such a conclusion is based on the following reasoning: "The aim
of Article 77 is to encourage mitigation of loss. To this end,
measures directed at mitigating the loss are to be taken as soon
258 See STOLL, supra note 18, at 560-63. This form of loss is sometimes referred
to as "incidental loss." Id.
259 See generally ZIEGEL, supra note 21, at 9-41.
260 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 73. See also Secretariat Commentary on Arti-
cle 73, supra note 220; KNAPP, supra note 23, at 566-67.
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as the party to the contract could foresee the danger of breach of
the contract by the other party and of his potential loss."261
With respect to a fundamental breach, it has been said that
if it is clear that such a breach will take place, 262 the party con-
cerned "cannot await the contract date of performance before he
declares the contract avoided and takes measures to reduce the
loss arising out of the breach by making a cover purchase, resel-
ling the goods or otherwise." 263  Further, it should be
remembered that Articles 71 and 72 of the CISG govern the con-
duct of parties in "anticipatory breach" situations. It is impor-
tant, for the purpose of this discussion, to bear in mind that the
procedure in these provisions is of a non-mandatory character:
Article 71 does not oblige the aggrieved party to suspend his
obligations where it is apparent that the other party will not
perform a "substantial" part of his obligations;264 in a similar
vein, under Article 72 it is not required that the aggrieved party
avoid that contract when it is clear that a fundamental breach
will take place.265
Some commentaries recommend that in the case of an an-
ticipatory breach and, in particular, in the case of a fundamen-
tal breach, the procedures prescribed in Articles 71 and 72 be
used.266 It is further stated that if the party does not follow this
procedure, i.e., does not suspend his performance and avoid the
contract, and insists on the performance by the other party,
there will be a risk for the party to be found not in compliance
with Article 77.267 Therefore, if the aggrieved party, in a situa-
tion of an anticipatory breach, wants to comply with Article 77,
he should follow either the procedure in Articles 71 and 72 and,
if a positive result does not follow, subsequently mitigate; or he
should mitigate as soon as he could foresee the breach.268
261 KNAPP , supra note 23, at 566-67.
262 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 72(1).
263 Secretariat Commentary on Article 73, supra note 220, 4. See also
KNAPP, supra note 23, at 567.
264 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(1).
265 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 72(1).
266 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 567. See also CISG, supra note 1, art. 73;
Secretariat Commentary on Article 73, supra note 229, 4.
267 See KNAPP, supra note 23, at 567.
268 See id.
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However, as mentioned above, while the duty to mitigate
may, in certain cases, be applied to an anticipatory breach situ-
ation, there is no such general requirement. 269 If, for example,
prior to the contract date, one party refuses to perform his obli-
gations and wants to repudiate the contract, nothing in the
Convention obliges the other party to follow Article 72, i.e., to
avoid the contract or accept the repudiation. He is fully entitled
to continue his performance and to demand the performance
from the other party. Accordingly, there will be no need for him
to mitigate if he continues to perform and expects the same
from the other party.270 Therefore, generally, if the perform-
ance from the party in breach does not take place at the con-
tract date, the injured party can subsequently sue for damages,
without apprehending that his claim can be reduced.
However, it is further suggested that this solution should
not always be the case. There are categories of cases where the
duty to mitigate, in a situation of an anticipatory breach, should
be regarded as necessary in order not to suffer a sanction of re-
duction in damages under Article 77.
Why should there be such a necessity? In order to find an
answer to this question let us first consider whether analogous
situations arose in some legal systems. It seems that English
law can be particularly helpful in this respect.
A general rule is that when one party repudiates the con-
tract prior to the performance date, the other party has an op-
tion. He can refuse to accept the repudiation and treat the
contract as subsisting. In this case, the contract continues to
exist and no need to mitigate arises. Alternatively, he can ac-
cept the repudiation and treat the contract as at an end. In this
case, he has the right to sue the breaching party at once. This
right will then be subject to the mitigation rule.271
269 The term "requirement" should not be considered in the light of the status
of the duty to mitigate, discussed in section III(4)(a) of this article. It refers to the
sanction, which will follow in case of non-performance of the duty to mitigate. In
other words, we are not concerned whether the party is obliged to mitigate in case
of an anticipatory breach - this issue has been already examined. Our concern is
only whether the amount claimed should be reduced if mitigation has not taken
place.
270 Compare examples and solutions in HONNOLD, supra note 73, at 516-17.
See also Secretariat Commentary on Article 73, supra note 220; KNAPP, supra note
23, at 562-63.
271 See McGREGOR, supra note 134, at 174.
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However, despite this rule being a well-established one, it
is subject to two exceptions: (1) where it simply could not work;
and (2) where it would lead to "wholly unreasonable" results.
The first category includes cases where performance of the
obligations is based on the cooperation between the parties.
Where performance of the obligations by the innocent party de-
pends on that of the party in breach, it may turn out that the
former will not be able to carry out his part of the obligations
without the latter's cooperation. 272 "In most cases by refusing
co-operation the party in breach can compel the innocent party
to restrict his claim to damages."273 Therefore, where it is es-
tablished that performance was not possible without the cooper-
ation of the parties, the innocent party can be found as having
been bound to accept repudiation.274 In this case, his right to
damages will be subject to the "duty" to mitigate.
The second category includes situations in which the ab-
sence of the "legitimate interest" of the innocent party has been
proved.
[Ihf it can be shown that a person has no legitimate interest, fi-
nancial or otherwise, in performing the contract rather than
claiming damages, he ought not to be allowed to saddle the other
party with an additional burden with no benefit to himself. If a
party has no interest to enforce a stipulation, he cannot in general
enforce it: so it might be said that, if a party has no interest to
insist on a particular remedy, he ought not to be allowed to insist
on it.
2 7 5
An example, given in White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v.
McGregor, will help illustrate the concept. A company had con-
cluded the contract with an expert. Under the contract, the ex-
pert undertook to go abroad in order to compile a report.
Shortly after the conclusion of the contract and before anything
was done, the company repudiated the contract. The expert
still intended to carry out his part of the obligations. It has
272 The concept of cooperation is not restricted only to active cooperation. It
implies "passive" co-operation as well. This rule was developed in Hounslow
London Borough Council v. Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd., 1 Ch. 233,
253-54 (1971).
273 White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor, 2 A.C. 428 (H.L. 1961).
274 See Attica Sea Carriers Corporation v. Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Reederei
G.M.B.H., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 205, 256 (C.A. 1975).
275 White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor, 2 A.C. 428, 431 (H.L. 1961).
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been said that "[t]o allow such an expert then to waste
thousands of pounds in preparing the report cannot be right if a
much smaller sum of damages would give him full compensa-
tion for his loss. '276
What are the criteria of determining the legitimate inter-
est? At present, no distinct criteria have been developed in En-
glish law. Nevertheless, certain rules, in this respect, have
been established.
First, from the above-mentioned example, it may seem that
reasonableness is the criterion. Certainly, reasonableness is a
very important factor. However, proof that the innocent party
has acted unreasonably will not suffice to prove the absence of a
legitimate interest.277 In order to determine the presence or ab-
sence of a legitimate interest, it will be necessary to distinguish
between "merely unreasonable" and "wholly unreasonable"
actions.2
78
Second, a legitimate interest will not be established by ref-
erence only to the interests of the innocent party. The innocent
party must take into consideration the interests of the breach-
ing party as well. 279 Presumably, this rule represents a further
development of the primary statement of the basic rule in White
and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor, which provided that the
breaching party should not be "saddled... with an additional
burden."280
Third, the legitimate interest should be established on the
condition that damages are an adequate remedy.281
Since the concept of a legitimate interest is rather abstract,
the rules governing its determination may seem to be "vague."
It has been correctly pointed out that an absolute certainty can
never be attained.28 2 Nonetheless, these rules will represent
276 Id at 428-29.
277 See Clea Shipping Corporation v. Bulk Oil International Ltd., 1 All E.R.
129 (Q.B. 1983).
278 See id at 651.
279 See Stocznia Gdanska S.A. v. Latvian Shipping Co., Latreefers Inc. and
Others, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 132, 138-39 (C.A. 1996).
280 White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor 2 A.C. 428, 431 (H.L. 1961).
281 See Attica Sea Carriers Corporation v. Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Reederei
G.M.B.H., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 250, 255 (C.A. 1975).
282 See generally Clea Shipping Corporation v. Bulk Oil International Ltd, 1
All E.R. 129 (1983).
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the basis for determining the presence or absence of a legiti-
mate interest in the context of the circumstances of a concrete
case.
Are the situations involving the elements of cooperation
and legitimate interest likely to arise in international sales?
Should such situations be treated as "exceptions" to the general
position under Article 72? The answer to these questions
should be "yes."
Let us start with the cooperation element. Suppose, it is
"clear" that a fundamental breach will occur. 2 3 The innocent
party, however, thinks that he is perfectly entitled to the per-
formance and does not avoid the contract. The contract, of
course, remains in existence. The innocent party needs to con-
tinue to perform because he does not want to be in breach him-
self. The problem, however, is that he cannot perform unless
the breaching party cooperates. In other words, the perform-
ance of the innocent party's obligations is pre-determined by
that of the breaching party. For example, in an Ex-works con-
tract, the buyer has an obligation to take delivery of the goods
when they are placed at his disposal. 28 4 However, the buyer
will not be able to take delivery if the seller does not carry out
his delivery obligation, the goods available to the buyer. In an
FOB contract, the seller will not be able to make a delivery if
the buyer fails to nominate a ship. The seller will not be able to
manufacture the goods for the buyer if the latter does not per-
form his obligation to supply the seller with the necessary
materials. In these types of situations, the innocent party may
be compelled to treat the contract as avoided. If the innocent
party is compelled to avoid the contract, he will be subject to a
"duty" to mitigate, as provide by Article 77.
The question arises: Can the innocent party require specific
performance in such cases? 28 5 Here, it is necessary to draw a
line between those obligations that are already due and those
that are not. For example, in the FOB contract, the refusal to
pay and accept a delivery before the due date can be regarded as
an indication of an anticipatory breach. But in the context of
283 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 72.
284 See JAN RAMBERG, ICC GUIDE TO INCOTERMS 2000: UNDERSTANDING AND
PRACTICAL USE Section EXW, B4 (1999).
285 See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 46, 62.
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cooperation, the innocent party will need the enforcement only
of those obligations that are necessary to perform his part of the
contract. Therefore, in order for the FOB seller to make a deliv-
ery, he will need the enforcement of the buyer's obligation to
nominate a ship. If the seller wants to go on with the contract,
the buyer's refusal to perform future obligations (to pay and to
take a delivery) will not affect the seller's ability to deliver the
goods. Accordingly, at this stage the seller does not need to be
concerned about the enforcement of the future obligations. The
seller will need to be concerned with it when he succeeds in en-
forcing his obligation, completes his part of the contract, expects
the buyer's final performance of payment, and accepts delivery.
When the seller seeks to enforce the buyer's obligation to nomi-
nate a ship, he will be dealing with an actual but not an antici-
patory breach. This is so because this obligation precedes the
seller's delivery date. Accordingly, the innocent party will be
entitled to specific performance with respect to this obligation.
However, this remedy may not always be available. Article
28 provides that "a court is not bound to enter a judgement for
specific performance unless the court would do so under its own
law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by the
Convention."28 6 If the innocent party is not successful in enforc-
ing this remedy, then he will have no choice but to treat the
contract as avoided and certainly will be under a duty to miti-
gate his loss. 28 7
Will the innocent party's right to specific performance be
affected because of the breaching party's inability to perform?
Generally, the answer should be "no." In a legal sense, this right
will remain unaffected. 288 He will lose that right only if the in-
ability is based on the conditions set out in Article 79. 289 How-
286 CISG, supra note 1, art. 28. The problem regarding entering judgments for
specific performance is more likely to arise in common law courts, which are more
reluctant to grant this remedy than the civil law courts.
287 See GUNTER HAGER, COMMENTARY ON THE U.N. CONVENTION IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 485 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas
trans., 2d ed. 1998).
288 See ULRICH HUBER, COMMENTARY ON THE U.N. CONVENTION IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 380-81 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas
trans., 2d ed. 1998).
289 See id.
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ever, it seems that in practice it will be difficult to force a party
to perform when he objectively cannot do so.
Thus, in international sales, the cooperation element some-
times may compel the innocent party to avoid the contract and
to be subject to the "duty" to mitigate. However, the innocent
party normally will be entitled to specific performance. This
remedy presumably will be targeted at the actual breach. But,
we should still regard the cooperation element in the light of an
anticipatory breach because the actual breach is the result of a
general anticipatory breach. The performance of the obligation
that was actually breached occurs earlier than the performance
of the obligations that form the basis of the anticipatory breach.
Further, Article 28 may limit the innocent party's right to spe-
cific performance. And even in some situations, where the
party still has a right to specific performance, it may be impos-
sible to enforce it due to the breaching party's objective inability
to perform.
The second exception to the right, provided in Article 72,
should be proof of the absence of a legitimate interest. It has
already been shown that it is virtually impossible to give a clear
definition to this concept. The best way to illustrate this con-
cept is to consider it in the light of a hypothetical.
Hypothetical A:290 On June 1, Buyer A and Seller B made a
contract for B to produce and deliver to A 10,000 sheets of steel
on August 1 at $50 per sheet. A needed the steel for use in man-
ufacturing. On July 1, B notified A that production difficulties
in B's steel mill would prevent delivery of the steel by August 1.
B also stated that the production difficulties might persist for
an unknown period after August 1 and urged A to obtain the
steel elsewhere. Comparable steel was available in A's area.
The price at all times remained at $50. For unexplained rea-
sons, A did not seek or obtain the steel elsewhere. As a conse-
quence, A's production facilities were shut down for the month
of August. A sued B for damages based on shutdown losses of
$10,000 per day, or $300,000. Seller B argued that, under Arti-
cle 77, A failed to "take such measures as are reasonable in the
circumstances to mitigate the loss" so that there should be a
corresponding reduction in the damages.
290 This example was taken from HONNOLD, supra note 73, at 517.
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It seems that, in this example, A's damages claim should be
reduced by the amount that could have been avoided. This con-
clusion is based on the absolute absence of any interest A could
have in this particular transaction. What did A's treatment of
the- existing contract lead to? Can we trace realization or mani-
festation of any form of interest, and economic interest, in the
first place? If A had bought the steel, and he had every opportu-
nity to do so, he most likely would have prevented part of his
loss (loss of profit, for example). B, in turn, would have given
him an adequate compensation for the loss, 291 which had been
caused by the breach and could not have been avoided. The
closest that we can get in formulating a general criterion for
determining the legitimate interest is to say that A's conduct, in
these circumstances, was "wholly unreasonable."
It has been said that, in this situation, A's right to specific
performance is irrelevant. 292 The reason is that a court would
not be able "to overcome its production facilities."293 In this
case, we, once again, see the party's inability to perform as well
as the court's inability to enforce specific performance in spite of
the existence of the right to this remedy. However, it is argued
that the proof of the absence of the legitimate interest should
prevent the innocent party from exercising his right to specific
performance.
Hypothetical B:294 B undertook to manufacture certain
goods for A. The goods are to be produced according to A's par-
ticular specifications. It is not possible to find any market for
these goods, since the goods are suitable only for a very specific
use. Before B starts production, A makes it clear that he no
longer has an interest in the goods and urges B not to produce
them. Should B, nevertheless, start the production, exercise his
right to specific performance, and force A to accept the goods
and pay for them? 295
It seems that B should not be allowed to do so. Knowing
that damages can provide adequate compensation, B does not
291 This rule was established in Attica Sea Carriers Corporation v. Ferrostaal
Poseidon Bulk Reederei G.M.B.H., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 250 (C.A. 1975).
292 See HONNOLD, supra note 73, at 518.
293 Id.
294 RAMBERG, supra note 204 at 120.
295 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 62.
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have any legitimate interest in manufacturing the goods, which
will be of no use whatsoever. In this case, it is particularly im-
portant that the innocent party bears in mind the interests of the
breaching party. 29 6 The court, in turn, should not grant specific
performance. The exercise of this remedy will impose a sub-
stantial burden on A without any benefit to B. 29 7 The correct
solution should be B's avoidance of the contract and receiving
an adequate compensation in the form of damages.
How can we reconcile this approach with the legal right to
specific performance established by the CISG? It seems that
the only "counterbalance" to this right is a "duty" to mitigate. It
has been correctly pointed out that "the different theoretical ap-
proaches may fade away when transformed into practical
realities."298
Thus, we have seen that in some situations, keeping the
contract alive may be "wholly unreasonable and untenable."299
In such situations, the innocent party will not, as a rule, have
any legitimate interest in further performance of the contract.
Although the concept was developed in English law, it poten-
tially embodies the practical situations; this can arise in inter-
national sales. Moreover, the rules established in English law
for determining the presence or absence of legitimate interest
can serve as extremely useful guidelines in practice. Finally,
the right to specific performance, which the innocent party can
try to exercise, should be restricted.
(d) Mitigation in a "Lost Volume" Situation
This article has suggested that a "lost volume" situation
should be governed by the CISG. A "lost volume" seller should
be allowed to recover damages flowing from this type of loss,
provided that a number of requirements, suggested by this
work,300 and standards for limiting damages have been met.
However, the peculiar nature of a "lost volume" situation makes
296 This rule was established in Stocznia Gdanska S.A. v. Latvian Shipping
Co., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 132 (C.A. 1996).
297 See generally White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor, 2 AC 428 (H.L.
1961).
298 RAMBERG, supra note 204, at 120.
299 Gator Shipping Corporation v. Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. and Occidental
Shipping Establishment, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 357, 375 (1978) (opinion of Justice Kerr).
300 See section III(4)(d) of this article for a discussion on this topic.
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it impossible for one such standard to be carried out. Specifi-
cally, the mitigation rule is not possible in such circumstances.
It has been stated that, depending on the circumstances,
mitigation measures can have different forms. 301 However,
when a seller suffers loss of volume, his mitigation measure (if
it were possible to mitigate) generally should have the form of
finding a substitute buyer and reselling the goods under the
original contract. Where a seller makes such a resale, thinking
that he thereby performs his "duty" to mitigate, he does not, in
fact, avoid his loss. He will not minimize the lost profits that are
the result of the breach of the first transaction by making a sec-
ond transaction because the second transaction would have
been made even if there had been no breach. Let us illustrate
this point.
A agreed to buy a bicycle from B for $100. This deal would
give B a profit of $10. A breaches the contract by refusing to
take delivery of the bicycle and pay for it. B resells the bicycle
to C, to whom he would have sold an identical bicycle in any
event, even if A had not breached. Therefore, the sale to C will
not affect B's actual damages. B should be entitled to claim $10
as his lost profit.
An analogous situation has arisen in a case decided by
Oberster Gerichtshof 28 April 2000.302 The court found that,
after the buyer breached the contract by having refused to pay
for the jewelry, the seller did not perform a substitute transac-
tion. The buyer contended that the seller failed to mitigate his
loss, as required under Article 77 of the CISG. The court held
that this argument was ineffective
as far as the promisee, in performing the substitute transaction,
would have lost another similar transaction bringing the same
profit as the first transaction... [Buyer's] (completely unsubstan-
tiated) objection that [seller] failed to mitigate damages is there-
fore irrelevant, because the Court of First Instance found that a
miscellaneous resale of the goods intended for the [buyer] would
have materialized independently of the [buyer's] order.30 3
301 See section III(4)(b) of this article for a discussion on this topic.
302 The facts of the case have been briefly stated in section II(2)(c) of this
article.
303 Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] 2 Ob 100/00w, 28 Apr. 2000 (Aus.),
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgwais/db/cases2/000428a3.html.
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Thus, it can generally be concluded that a "lost-volume"
seller cannot mitigate his damages. Can this conclusion be rec-
onciled with the provision, stipulated in Article 77? It seems
that Article 77 does not preclude us from making such a conclu-
sion. It provides that mitigation measures should be such "as
are reasonable in circumstances." Measures that are known to
lead to no mitigation whatsoever can hardly be considered to be
"reasonable."30 4
However, it can be argued that circumstances of a particu-
lar case reveal methods of mitigation. Imagine, in the above-
mentioned case,30 5 although there was no possibility to mitigate
by reselling that piece of jewelry itself because there was no de-
mand whatsoever for that particular design, it is possible to
avoid whole or part of the loss in a different way. For example,
the seller has divided the jewelry into pieces and sold the pre-
cious stones from the jewelry. For our purposes, let's assume
that these measures were "reasonable" in the meaning of Arti-
cle 77 (although it is likely that in many cases such measures
would be considered to be "unreasonable" or "excessive"). It
seems possible to prove that these measures were mitigation.
How does this situation correlate with our conclusion that it is
impossible to mitigate in a lost volume case? The answer is that
at the moment the seller manages to find a "reasonable" way to
mitigate, he cannot be regarded as a lost volume seller, even
though, at the first glance, the situation seemed to be a lost vol-
ume situation. First, the central point of the lost volume doc-
trine is that the seller cannot realize the expected volume. In
our example, it may be said that, strictly speaking, the seller
lost volume of sales of the jewelry itself. However, in essence,
he did not lose volume because, in one form or another, he man-
aged to resell "the unit." Second, one of the requirements that a
seller must meet in order to qualify as a lost volume seller is
that the first and second transactions must be "wholly indepen-
dent events,"30 6 i.e., there should not be any causal connection
between these two transactions. 30 7 In the example above, the
304 For the discussion of the standard of "reasonableness," see section II(4)(b)
of this article.
305 Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Courtl 2 Ob 100/00w, 28 Apr. 2000 (Aus.),
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000428a3.html.
306 See the discussion in section II(2)(c) of this article.
307 See Holisky, supra note 81, at n.110.
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seller would not have broken up the jewelry and sold it in pieces
had there been no breach. Therefore, this cannot be a lost vol-
ume situation.
5. Certainty
Most legal systems have a requirement as to certainty of
damages claimed. 30 8 An analogous requirement can be found in
the UNIDROIT Principles. 30 9 This part of the article will ex-
amine the position of the CISG in relation to this issue.
The CISG does not contain any express reference to cer-
tainty °10 However, this article suggests that this limitation
still can be applied to the cases regulated by the CISG.311 Sev-
eral ways of how this rule can be applied will be discussed.
First, it can be applied through the procedural law of the fo-
rum.312 It has been said that the "[p]roblems of proof and cer-
tainty of loss are procedural matters which remain within the
province of national law, and procedural conceptions may still
serve as covert limitations on CISG consequential awards."31 3
It follows from this statement that the procedural issues are be-
yond the scope of the CISG.314 Therefore, if, for example, proce-
dural law of country A contains a requirement as to the proof of
certainty, the court may consider it mandatory to apply this re-
quirement to a dispute governed by the CISG. In this case,
such a decision will reflect the court's opinion that procedural
rules are not regulated by the Convention. For example, in case
No 304/1993 (decision dated 3 March 1995) considered by Tribu-
nal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian
Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the plaintiff
was denied compensation of "moral harm" because, among
308 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 192. See also McGREGOR, supra note 134, at
214-30 (discussing the position in English law).
309 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.3(1). In particular, Article
7.4.3(1) provides that "[c]ompensation is due only for harm, including future harm,
that is established with a reasonable degree of certainty." Id.
310 See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.3(1). See also Schneider,
supra note 18, at 229-30; Schneider, supra note 148.
311 See generally Schneider, supra note 148.
312 See generally id.
313 Id. See BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 101.
314 See generally Schneider, supra note 148. "Certainly, matters that are
clearly procedural will not be subject to the CISG or any other rules besides those
of the forum." Id.
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other things, the amount of the claim was not substantiated. 315
Presumably, the certainty standard within the framework of
this arbitration institution is based on the requirement that
every party must prove the circumstances to which it refers as
the basis of its claims and defenses. 3 16 Therefore, the require-
ment of proving the amount of "loss" has been, to some extent,
imposed. The basis for the requirement was the procedural re-
quirement in the respective rules. It seems that the decision
implied that the procedural rule was beyond the scope of the
CISG.
Second, the view can be taken that certainty is a matter
governed but not expressly settled in the Convention. Certainty
can be treated either as a procedural issue, "indirectly" gov-
erned by the CISG,317 or merely as a substantive rule, governed
but not expressly settled in the Convention. In this case, re-
course must be first had to one of the general principles on
which the Convention is based. The issue of whether the Con-
vention contains a general principle in relation to certainty of
damages is arguable and may require further elaboration. If no
relevant general principle is found, the matter must be settled
in accordance with the applicable rules of Private International
Law (PIL). However, it is important to note that, if certainty of
damages is treated as a procedural matter, recourse to rules of
PIL may turn out to be irrelevant because rules of PIL point at
the substantive, rather than the procedural part of the legal sys-
tem in question.31s In such a situation, the only reasonable way
to proceed is to apply the procedural rules of the forum contain-
ing the provisions on certainty.3 1 9
315 See Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Fed-
eration Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 304/1993, 3 Mar. 1995 (Russ.), http:/
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/9590303rl.html). See also ROZENBERG,
supra note 98, at 73.
316 See ROZENBERG, supra note 98, at 70 (referring to the Rules of the Arbitra-
tion that are in question).
317 See ROLF HERBERT, COMMENTARY ON THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 46-7 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas
trans., 2d ed. 1998) (where the commentator states that "the CISG occasionally
governs procedural rules indirectly"). Id.
318 See VIKTOR P. ZVEKOV, MEZHUDNARODNOYE CHASTNOYE PRAVO [INTERNA-
TIONAL PRIVATE LAW] 22, 116 (1999).
319 See id. The concept of applicability of certainty, where it is considered a
procedural rule, is beyond the scope of the CISG.
20021 369
63
PACE INT'L L. REV.
Third, the issue of certainty of damages is directly related
to the problem of proof.320 In practice, the proof of the precise
amount of damages may not always be possible. Therefore, the
extent of compensation can be determined on the basis of a
mere discretion of a judge or an arbitrator. Such a solution to
the problem of certainty can be found in a relevant provision of
an applicable law.321 This result may follow from either of the
two approaches discussed above, i.e., where the issue of cer-
tainty is regarded as being either outside the scope of the CISG
or "governed but not expressly settled," in it, as well as from an
application of the UNIDROIT Principles. 322 However, an analo-
gous result also may follow where there were no grounds for
such discretion. It seems that this approach has been taken in
the ICC Arbitration Award 8611/HV/JK of 1997.323 Namely, it
has been stated that because of "the arbitrator's lack of reliable
documents concerning the number of the machines for which
[buyer's] customers did not pay because of non-delivery of re-
placement parts, the arbitrator must judge the damages accord-
ing to his own conviction having taken into consideration the
circumstances. " 3 2 4
Fourth, one author argues that regulating the issue of cer-
tainty can be carried out on the basis of the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples.325 Since one of the purposes of the Principles is to
interpret or supplement international uniform law instru-
ments, 326 such as the CISG, they can be used to supplement
those provisions, which are within the Convention's scope but
not expressly settled in it.327 That author suggests that the
320 See BRAGINSKIY & VITRYANSK1Y, supra note 30, at 531.
321 See TREITEL, supra note 8, at 174-77 (giving a number of examples in which
different legal systems confer this right of judicial discretion). See id.
322 This point will be further elucidated in the next section of this paper.
323 See (Industrial Equipment) Court of Arbitration of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce 8611/HV/JK (ICC 1997), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/
db/cases2/978611il.html.
324 Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce 8611/HV/
JK (ICC 1997), http://www.cisg/law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/978611il.html
(emphasis added). See also REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 406-07 (PACE INT'L L. REV ed., 1998).
325 See Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles
in International Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay between the Princi-
ples and the CISG, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1149, 1188 (1995).
326 See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, pbml.
327 See Garro, supra note, 325 at 1155-57.
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UNIDROIT Principles be regarded as "a component part of the
'general principles' underlying the CISG.''328 Thus, considering
the issue of certainty as falling within the Convention's scope,
the commentator states that the "UNIDROIT Principles
[A]rticle 7.4.3 complements [Article 74] of the CISG ... by em-
phasizing that the existence and extent of the harm to be com-
pensated must be established with a reasonable degree of
certainty."329 If this degree of certainty cannot be achieved, the
court will have the discretion to assess damages. 330 It is sub-
mitted that this treatment of certainty represents a workable
solution, which is conducive to maintaining the Convention's in-
ternational character and contributing to uniformity in its ap-
plication. However, one still can argue whether this issue is
governed by the Convention and whether the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples can be regarded as part of the general principles underly-
ing the Convention.
In order to develop this discussion further let us analyze
other cases decided in different jurisdictions.
In the Delchi case, the court found that damages for loss of
profit must be proved with reasonable certainty. 331 This find-
ing was based on certainty as it has been established in com-
mon law.332 However, in the present context, it can be said that
this decision was flawed in two respects. First, there was no
basis for the decision to apply a common law standard. 333 Sec-
ond, since certainty had been considered to be a procedural rule,
its application should not have exceeded the procedural lim-
its. 334 Namely, the following has been said:
There is a distinction between a court determining that evidence
is unreliable or uncertain and a court not allowing any evidence of
328 See id. at 1156.
329 See id. at 1188.
330 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 7.4.3(3).
331 See generally Delchi Carrier, S.p.A., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12820
(N.D.N.Y. 1994); Schneider, supra note 148; Joanne M. Darkey, A U.S. Court's In-
terpretation of Damage Provisions under the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: A Preliminary Step towards an International Juris-
prudence of CISG or a Missed Opportunity,? 15 J.L. & CoM. 139, 145 (1995), avail-
able at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/darkey2.html.
332 See generally Schneider, supra note 148.
333 See id.
334 See id.
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a type of loss because the law of the jurisdiction refuses to allow
damages for that type of loss as a matter of law. 3 3 5
Thus, the certainty rule, even if it is applied to a CISG case,
should not prevent the injured party from claiming the loss that
otherwise can be claimed legally under the Convention. Even
though that is the way it would be applied under that particular
legal system, the court does not have the right to restrict the
Convention's legal regime and the legitimate rights established
by the CISG. Moreover, the "international character" of the
Convention as well as the need to promote uniformity in its ap-
plication 336 should prevent the courts from applying this stan-
dard in such a way.
A case decided by the German Supreme Court on the basis
of the ULIS 337 does not make clear whether, in determining the
amount of damages, the court was guided by national law or by
the principles of ULIS.338 Similarly, it is unclear what stan-
dards of certainty some other German courts applied. In one
case, one of the grounds for rejecting the buyer's claim for dam-
ages was that the buyer "failed to substantiate her purported
damages in detail."3 39 In another case, the court stated that
under Article 74 of the CISG, the buyer had to "exactly calculate
her damage."340
Thus, the standard of certainty can be and is sometimes im-
posed on the parties in the CISG cases, even though the Con-
vention does not directly provide for it. This work has
suggested several ways in which the requirement of certainty
could be applied. The analysis of several cases has revealed dif-
ferent approaches to, and the lack of clarity in, the treatment of
this issue. The question of what is a correct approach remains
open.
335 Id.
336 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
337 See Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court] 24 Oct. 1980, cited in Schneider,
supra note 148, at fn. 159, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/
articles/schnedr2.html. See generally Schneider, supra note 148.
338 See id.
339 Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court] 12 U 62/97, 5 Oct. 1998
(F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/981005gl.html. "The
figures presented by the [buyer] do not enable the Court to estimate the purported
damage." Id.
340 Oberlandesgericht [Provincial Court of Appeals Court] 3 U 246/97, 2 Sept.
1998 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/980902gl.html.
[Vol. 14:307
66http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/4
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
6. Fault
Under the CISG, fault is neither a basis for liability nor a
requirement for availability of any remedy or determination of
the extent of liability. Accordingly, the right to recover dam-
ages under the CISG is not connected to "proof or even pre-
sumption" of the party's "culpable breach."341 This conclusion
derives from the fact that the basis of liability is any kind of
objective non-performance of the obligations under the contract
and the CISG. 342 Therefore, this concept cannot produce any
legal effects within the framework of the Convention. It has
been said, however, that the liability under the CISG cannot be
regarded as "absolutely strict"343 because the party can be ex-
empt from liability under Article 79.344
7. Burden of Proof
The importance of the issue of the burden of proof should
not be underestimated. Although burden of proof is a procedu-
ral matter in nature, the way it is allocated between the parties
can often pre-determine the outcome of a case. Certainly, this
issue is of particular importance when it comes to proving the
standards of limiting damages. In order to determine who will
bear the burden of proving these standards, it is necessary to
identify a general principle of allocating the burden of proof.
The problem, however, is that the CISG does not explicitly pro-
vide for such a rule. The Convention's silence on this problem
has produced divergent opinions of legal scholars and, most im-
portantly, divergent interpretations and applications of the
CISG. Namely, some commentators believe that the issue of
the burden of proof is not governed by the Convention and
should be regulated by applicable domestic law.345 Several
cases have reflected this view. In one case, a Swiss court held
that the CISG did not contain rules on burden of proof and de-
341 BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 97, 118.
342 See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 45(1) and 61(1). See also BERNSTEIN &
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 97, 118.
343 BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 97.
344 See BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 97. See also CISG, supra
note 1, art. 79.
345 See generally Franco Ferrari, Burden of Proof under the Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 5 INT'L Bus. L. J. 665 (2000),
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/biblio/alpha05.html.
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cided to rely on the rules of Private International Law of the
forum.346 In the ICC Arbitral Award No. 6653, the Tribunal
was also of the opinion that the issue of the burden of proof was
not governed by the CISG. 347
One case has revealed another view. Namely, the arbitral
tribunal regulated the issue of burden of proof on the basis of
general principles of law.348 A discussion of this approach ulti-
mately can lead to a long debate on the status of the concept of
lex mercatoria in regulation of international commercial trans-
actions. 349 Here, it will be stated only that this approach to reg-
ulation of burden of proof is lacking support.350
It is argued that the CISG governs the issue of the burden
of proof.351 As has been pointed out by many commentators,
Article 79 contains a rule that specifically allocates the burden
of proof.352 Accordingly, it cannot be asserted that the CISG
346 See Bezirksgericht der Saane (Zivilgericht) [District Court] T 171/95, 20
Feb. 1997 (Switz.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgtwais/db/cases2/970220sl.
html).
347 See (Thyseen v. Maaden) Cour d'appel [Appeal Court] 6 Apr. 1995 (Fr.),
httpJ/www.cisglaw.pace.edu/cisgwais/db/cases2/95040gfl.html, cited in Ferrari,
supra note 345.
348 (Crude Metal) Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Com-
merce 7645 (ICC 1995), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/957645
il.html.
349 See LIBER AMORICUM FOR THE RT. HON. LORD WILBERFORCE, 3-4 at 109
(Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds., 1982) (where Mustill, L.J. has compiled the list
of all possible sources of lex mercatoria. General principles of law represented one
of those sources.).
350 Although it is not entirely clear from the excerpt of the decision whether
the Tribunal applied general principles of law in virtue of its being a part of Aus-
trian law, which was applicable, or of its being part of "international lex mer-
catoria," the present author is inclined to think that the Tribunal followed the
second reasoning. In any event, this work does not support this decision because as
will be seen later in this part of the work, this issue should be governed by the
CISG.
351 This seems to be a predominant view. See, e.g., HERBERT, supra note 317,
at 47. See also KNAPP, supra note 23, at 541. See generally; MAGNUS, supra note
236; Ferrari, supra note 345; Franco Ferrari Applying the CISG in a Truly Uni-
form Manner: Tribunale di Vigevano (Italy), 12 July 2000, 1 UNIF L REV 212
(2001), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/alpha05.html.
352 "A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he
proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he
could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the
time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its conse-
quences." CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). Magnus has pointed out several more
provisions in the text of the Convention, which, in his opinion, "allow one to con-
clude a specific distribution of the burden of proof." MAGNUS, supra note 236.
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does not govern this issue.353 A number of cases, decided in dif-
ferent jurisdictions, can be referred to in support of this view.
For example, several courts have clearly stated that, although
the CISG does not expressly deal with the burden of proof, it
governs this issue354 and should be interpreted to allow the rel-
evant principle to be found. 355
Since the Convention governs this matter, the allocation of
the burden of proof should be determined on the basis of a gen-
eral principle underlying the Convention. 356 The Tribunale di
Vigevano has identified such a principle.357 The party that in-
vokes its right to assert a claim must demonstrate the facts sup-
porting this claim. 35 8 Based upon this principle, the court, in
essence, has formulated another principle: if a party relies on
an exception, it must prove the factual prerequisites of that ex-
ception.359 It is to be noted that these principles have already
been formulated in scholarly writings.360
Thus, applying these principles to the issue of damages, it
can be stated that if the injured party asserts non-performance
by the other party and seeks damages, the injured party bears
353 See generally Ferrari, supra note 345.
354 See Handelsgericht [Commercial Court] HG930138 U/HG93, 9 Sept. 1993
(Switz.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisglwais/db/cases2/930909sl.html. See also.
(Cocoa Beans) Cantone del Ticino, La seconda Camera civile del Tribunale
d'appello [Appellate Court] 12.97.00193, 15 Jan. 1998 (Switz.), http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisgtwais/db/cases2/980115sl.html, cited in Ferrari, supra note 345.
355 See (E.K., L. vs. A. v. F.) Bundesgericht [Supreme Court] 4C.179/1998/odi,
28 Oct. 1998 (Switz.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/981028s1.
html.
356 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
357 See (Rheinland Verisicherungen v. Atlarex) Tribunale [District Court] 405,
12 July 2000 (Italy), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000712i3.
html.
358 See id. See also Landgericht [District Court] 2/1 0 7/94, 6 July 1994
(F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgwais/db/cases2/940706gl.html.; (Dansk
Blumsterexport A/s v. Frick Blumenhandel) Oberlandesgericht [Provincial Court
of Appeal] 4 R 161/94, 1 July 1994 (Aus.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/
db/cases2/94070la3.html.
359 See (Rheinland Verisicherungen v. Atlarex) Tribunale [District Court] 405,
12 July 2000 (Italy), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisg/wais/db/cases2/000712i3.
html. See generally Ferrari, supra note 351, at 213.
360 See generally MAGNUS, supra note 236. In addition to these two principles,
the third general principle has been said to exist. That is, the facts that lie in a
party's own sphere of responsibility and therefore better known to that party are to
be proven by that party since it exercises control over that sphere. See id. See
generally Ferrari, supra note 345.
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the burden of proving the non-performance and existence of the
damage. 361 Further, the injured party must also prove the fore-
seeability of loss by the other party,362 the causal link between
the breach and the loss 363 and, depending on the requirements
of certainty, the actual amount of loss suffered.364 As to mitiga-
tion, the rule should be as follows: the party who argues that
the injured party has not taken appropriate mitigation mea-
sures bears the burden of proving this allegation. 365
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to examine the methods of
limiting damages under the CISG as well as to highlight issues,
which need to be developed further. The first part of the article
focused on the issue of interests protected and the categories of
loss covered by the Convention. Special attention has been
given to examining the problems of "lost volume" and "non-ma-
terial" loss. Suggestions as to regulation of these types of loss
under the Convention have been made. The second part of the
361 See (Rheinland Verisicherungen v. Atlarex) Tribunale [District Court] 405,
12 July 2000 (Italy), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000712i3.
html. See also Handelsgericht [Commercial Court] HG 920670, 26 Apr. 1995
(Switz.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950426s1.html.
362 See Oberlandesgericht [Provincial Court of Appeal] 3 U 83/98, 13 Jan. 1999
(F.R.G.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/990113gl.html (where
the buyer bore the burden of proving that the seller foresaw or ought to have fore-
seen the buyer's loss).
363 See (Rheinland Verisicherungen v. Atlarex) Tribunale [District Court] 405,
12 July 2000 (Italy), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000712i3.
html. See also Handelsgericht [Commercial Court] HG 920670, 26 Apr. 1995
(Switz.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisglwais/db/cases2/950426s .html. See gen-
erally Ferrari, supra note 351, at 213; Ferrari, supra note 345.
364 See (Crude Metal) Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce 7645 (ICC 1995), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgwais/db/cases2/957
645il.html (where the duty to prove actual amount of loss suffered was imposed on
the party claiming damages. However, it is to be borne in mind that, as mentioned
above, the basis for allocation of burden of proof, used in this case, was not ac-
cepted by this work.).
365 See (Metal Concentrate) Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber
of Commerce 8574 (ICC 1996), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/96
8574il.html (where it was stated that it was the responsibility of "the party who
argues that the aggrieved party has not taken appropriate steps to prevent unnec-
essary damage from occurring which carries the burden of proof for his allegation
in this regard"). Id. See also Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] 2 Ob 100/00w,
28 Apr. 2000 (Aus.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000428a3.
html (providing an analogous approach).
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article concentrated on the methods of limiting damages. It has
been shown that potential problems primarily arise in practice
with respect to certain aspects of those methods, which are pro-
vided in the CISG, as well as with those that are not directly
mentioned in the Convention.
The examination of the foreseeability rule did not reveal
any particular difficulties. However, essential factors for evalu-
ating foreseeability have been emphasized, and some guidelines
have been given with respect to different aspects related to this
rule.
As to causation, this article suggests that, in the framework
of the CISG, it represents a field in which further theoretical
development may be necessary. It has been shown that there is
room for such an elaboration. Moreover, diverse practical situa-
tions may call for the solving of problems related to causation,
although such problems are not likely to arise in international
sales transactions very often.
A number of important factors connected with the mitiga-
tion principle have been considered. In general, it can be con-
cluded that the problems with the mitigation principle are
particularly acute in a situation of an anticipatory breach. In
this regard, some hypothetical examples have been given and
possible solutions to the problems have been suggested. Fur-
ther, this article has demonstrated that the operation of the
mitigation rule was impossible in the "lost volume" situation.
The certainty concept, in turn, is a principle, that has not
been directly provided in the Convention as a method of limit-
ing damages. Nevertheless, this article has shown the ways
through which its application could be possible in practice.
However, although its application can be justified in certain
cases, it is important to bear in mind the international charac-
ter of the Convention and the need to promote uniformity in its
application.
Finally, the fault principle does not exist in the CISG and
cannot produce any legal consequences.
In the end, the author would like to emphasize the impor-
tance of further development of these problems. Only provided
that there is a "firm" theoretical basis underpinning these is-
sues will the uniformity in application of the Convention be-
come more realistic.
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